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Article
Limits on the Perfect Preventive State
MICHAEL L. RICH
Traditional methods of crime prevention—the punishment of the
culpable and the preventive restraint of the dangerous—are slowly being
supplemented and supplanted by technologies that seek to perfectly prevent
crime. For instance, the federal government is developing in-car
technology that would prevent vehicle operation when a driver has a blood
alcohol level in excess of the legal limit. Less directly, the anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
try to prevent copyright infringement by eliminating technologies that
enable such infringement. Such structural regulation of private conduct is
not new, but few scholars have focused on its use to prevent crime, and
fewer still have examined how structural methods to fight crime fit within
legal theory. This Article begins that discussion with three aims. First, I
argue that perfect prevention—the use of technology by the State to make
criminal conduct practically impossible—is a novel approach to crime
prevention that requires separate scrutiny from punishment and
prevention. Second, I identify concerns with the use of perfect prevention
and propose limitations on the perfect preventive state that are responsive
to those concerns. Specifically, I address the impact of perfect prevention
on individual autonomy, concerns raised by the blanket application of
perfect prevention on all people, and the question of whether and when
perfect prevention should be the preferred approach for preventing certain
criminal conduct. Third, I highlight areas for future discussion of perfect
prevention by scholars.
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Limits on the Perfect Preventive State
MICHAEL L. RICH*
“If one could wave a wand and make it impossible for people
to kill each other, there might seem little reason to hesitate.”1
“But we should not pretend that [overcriminalization] is the
worst affliction that can ever befall a state; we could come to
utilize modes of social control that would make the criminal
law seem benign by comparison.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
3

A “gap” exists between punishment and prevention, the twin
traditional approaches to addressing crime.4 Within that gap, crime
appears inevitable. The punitive state enforces criminal laws by levying
punishment for their violation.5 The reach of punishment is limited by the
requirements that the State punish only after a crime has been committed6
and only in proportion to the seriousness of the offense.7 The preventive
*

Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law. J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A.,
University of Delaware. I am indebted to Jonathan Zittrain, Ed Cheng, Eric Goldman, Michael Cahill,
Miriam Baer, Kim Buchanan, Gregory M. Gilchrist, Steven R. Morrison, Erin Sheley, and the attendees
of the 2013 Internet Law Work-in-Progress Conferences for their feedback and comments, to Amy
Minardo for her comments and tireless support, and to Morgan Canady and Lincoln Bennett for their
research assistance.
1
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: AND HOW TO STOP IT 110 (2008).
2
Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 215 (2004).
3
See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations
of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 142 (2011) (“This choice between crime and
commitment leaves a gap.”); see also Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous
Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 58 (2004) (illustrating the gap using an example).
4
See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY
OF CRIMINAL LAW 4–5 (2009) (discussing the possible disconnect when using punishment as
prevention); Morse, supra note 3, at 56–58 (explaining how the gap allows some dangerous offenders
to remain free); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–31 (2001) (suggesting a shift from punishment to
prevention and its impact on dangerous offenders); Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the
Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 774, 776 (1998) (contrasting prevention and
punishment and the problems related to that distinction).
5
See Steiker, supra note 4, at 771–73 (highlighting constitutional implementations of punishment
and explorations of its limitations).
6
Morse, supra note 3, at 58.
7
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protection
against cruel and unusual punishment flows from the basic precept of justice that punishment for [a]
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state, meanwhile, “attempt[s] to identify and neutralize dangerous
individuals before they commit crimes by restricting their liberty in a
variety of ways.”8 Only those dangerous individuals who are not
responsible for their actions, like the mentally ill, or who otherwise cannot
be deterred by the threat of punishment may be subject to preemptive
liberty restrictions.9 Because of these limitations on punishment and
prevention, responsible people who are committed to their criminal goals
remain “free to pursue their projects until they actually offend, even if their
future wrongdoing is quite certain.”10
Understandably, this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs for those
whose job it is to protect the public, and they have responded by expanding
the scope of both the punitive and preventive states in the hope that the two
might eventually overlap. So lawmakers criminalize conduct thought to be
predictive of later criminal behavior, like gang membership, loitering, or
“material support” of possible terrorist organizations, in order to permit
punishment of the dangerous before they can cause actual harm.11 They
also make it easier to civilly commit people considered particularly
crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.” (alterations in original) (quoting Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))).
8
Steiker, supra note 4, at 774.
9
See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 693, 697 (2009) (identifying that “civil commitment of mentally disabled persons who
pose a danger to the community but lack the requisite intent to conform their conduct to the law is
justified”); Morse, supra note 3, at 58 (stating that “pre-emptive precautions” are taken, “including
broad preventive detention, with non-responsible agents based on an estimate of risk they present” and
“the medical/psychological systems of behavior control” justify “extraordinary liberty infringements”);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction,
with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 70
(1996) (stating that “states have statutes permitting the indefinite civil commitment of persons who are
mentally ill and dangerous”).
10
Morse, supra note 3, at 58; see also Ferzan, supra note 3, at 142 (indicating that there is “no
justification for substantial intervention against responsible agents prior to when they have committed a
criminal offense”). Of course, some crime also occurs because the punitive and preventive states are
not perfect. Criminals evade punishment for crimes they commit for a variety of reasons, including
mistakes made by police or prosecutors, wrong decisions reached by juries, and evidentiary issues that
make conviction impossible. These criminals remain free and can commit more crime. Such
imperfections also diminish the deterrence value of punishment, as potential criminals hold out hope
that they might be able to “get away with it.” The preventive state also inevitably fails as
dangerousness is difficult to predict. See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law,
58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 145 (2005) (noting that even with improvements in risk assessment, recidivism
predictions still cannot “prove future crimes . . . by clear and convincing evidence”).
11
See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2, 11 (2005) (defining “material support” to include lethal items,
“provision[s] of safe houses, transportation, communication, funds, false identification, and training,”
and indicating that “the material support charge functions as a basis for preventive charging against a
potential sleeper”); Robinson, supra note 4, at 1430 (“Gang membership and recruitment are now
punished.”); Steiker, supra note 4, at 774–75 (indicating that some localities provide “police broader
preventive authority by enacting new substantive offenses such as ‘drug loitering’ or ‘gang loitering’”).
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dangerous, such as sex offenders or suspected terrorists.
Meanwhile,
prosecutors push to expand the reach of existing inchoate crimes to allow
police to intervene earlier in potentially dangerous activities.13 Scholars
too are concerned with the gap between punishment and prevention and
have proposed to bridge it in a variety of ways, while still utilizing the
tools of prevention and punishment.14
Yet some technological tools are already available that can
supplement, and even supplant, punishment and prevention by rendering
criminal conduct practically impossible, and more are on the horizon.15
These tools, of what I call herein the “perfect preventive state,”16 enable
the State to target social problems caused by crime that punishment and
prevention have proven unable to reach. They do not depend on the
“deterrability” of potential criminals; rather, they seek to frustrate any
12

See ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE
PREVENTIVE STATE 3 (2006) (noting that “[predator] laws impose a restraint on sex offenders
before a new crime is committed” by using civil commitment); Morse, supra note 3, at 61, 65 (stating
that “the Supreme Court [recently] upheld the constitutionality of a new form of indefinite involuntary
civil commitment that applies to . . . mentally abnormal sexually violent predators” and that mental
health professionals may easily “[adjust] their expert testimony to support the conclusion that virtually
any sexually violent predator meets the lack of control standard”); Alec D. Walen, Crossing a Moral
Line: Long-Term Preventive Detention in the War on Terror, 28 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 15, 15–18
(2008) (indicating that “sexual predators [may] be detained even after they have served their sentences
if the case is made that they lack the normal ability to control their impulses” and that suspected
terrorists may be held in a “long-term preventative detention” even though the detainee has not been
convicted of a crime).
13
See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 456–59 (2007) (discussing the use of conspiracy
charges in preventive prosecution of suspected terrorists).
14
See, e.g., Ferzan, supra note 3, at 167–69 (arguing that responsible individuals may be subject
to preventive liberty deprivations if they have the intent to cause or risk causing harm and engage in
some act in furtherance of that intent); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 42 (arguing that preventive detention should be permitted if an individual “wants to
commit serious crime so badly that he is willing to be deprived of liberty or suffer similarly serious
consequences for it”).
15
Cf. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 4 (recognizing that potential victims often seek to
prevent crime by making it impossible); Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy:
Desert/Disease Jurisprudence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1125 (2011) (“The best hope for the future
is that we discover preventive, nonintrusive techniques that will lower the risk of violent offenses for
everyone . . . .”).
16
My use of the terms “perfect prevention” and “perfect preventive state” is inspired by Jonathan
Zittrain’s discussion of using tethered appliances to accomplish “perfect enforcement” of the law, see
ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 107–10, and Carol Steiker’s demarcation of the punitive and preventive
states, see Steiker, supra note 4, at 773–74. Like Zittrain, I use the adjective “perfect” to describe the
goal of the technology in question rather than its ultimate effectiveness in accomplishing that goal. See
infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. Perfect prevention is a form of what Zittrain calls
“preemption,” which involves “designing against undesirable conduct before it happens.” ZITTRAIN,
supra note 1, at 108. And like Steiker, my use of the word “state” refers not to one of the fifty states in
our federal system, but more generally to any sovereign governmental power. Steiker, supra note 4, at
773 n.19.
OF THE
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17

attempt to engage in the prohibited conduct. They do not require the
State to make the empirically challenging determination of who is
dangerous and irresponsible and therefore subject to special liberty
deprivation;18 instead, they target criminal conduct and aim to prevent
anyone from engaging in it.
Take the “epidemic” of gun violence, for example.19 More than 10,000
people are victims of homicides committed with a firearm each year, and
despite the efforts of law enforcement and legislatures, the rate of gun
fatalities has remained essentially constant over the last decade.20
Moreover, over four times that number suffer non-fatal injuries each year
as a result of intentional assaults with a firearm.21
This violence persists despite traditional efforts at deterrence through
punishment.22 Criminals who use or possess firearms face substantial
sentencing enhancements.23 Those who traffic in drugs or commit crimes
of violence and use, brandish, or discharge a firearm face onerous
mandatory minimum sentences.24 Even mere possession of a firearm by a
felon is a felony.25 Yet enhanced punishments are at best of marginal
17
See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing strategies designed to increase the
difficulty of causing harm as a way to prevent harm).
18
See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1337–38 (2012) (discussing the unreliability of the
predictions of future dangerousness and violence).
19
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 940 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). I use “gun violence”
here to mean the intentional use of a firearm to harm another person. Thus, the phrase excludes suicide
and accidental shootings, which caused nearly two-thirds of firearm fatalities in 2010. WISQARS Fatal
Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999–2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html (last updated Feb. 19, 2013) (select All
Intents; then select Firearm; then select 2010 to 2010; then submit request; then repeat previous steps
after first selecting Homicide and Legal Intervention; compare results). For the reasons explained
below, however, this Article focuses only on criminal conduct. See infra notes 75–77 and
accompanying text.
20
WISQARS Fatal Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999–2010, supra note 19 (select
Homicide and Legal Intervention; then select Firearm; then select 1999 to 1999; then submit request;
then repeat for every year from 1999 to 2010).
21
WISQARS Nonfatal Injury Reports, 2001–2012, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2013) (select ViolenceRelated; then select Firearm; then select 2001 to 2001; then submit request; then repeat for every year
from 2001 to 2011).
22
See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting
Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1641 (2002)
(stating that Congress has repeatedly raised the penalties for illegal gun possession).
23
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2) (2013) (increasing the base
offense level for robbery where a firearm was used); see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND
CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION 10, 13 (2009) (discussing state
laws enhancing punishment for felony offenses committed while using or brandishing a firearm).
24
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012); see also Beale, supra note 22, at 1670 (calling § 924(c) “a
kind of super-enhancement statute”).
25
18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
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26

benefit in deterring gun use, a fact confirmed by the sizable number of
criminals who continue to possess or use guns in the course of their
criminal activity.27
Similarly, preventive efforts that preemptively restrict the liberty of
dangerous, irresponsible individuals have not reduced gun violence to an
acceptable level. All jurisdictions provide mechanisms by which the State
can preventively detain mentally ill people who present a danger to
themselves or others before they can cause harm.28 Federal law prohibits
people who have been “‘adjudicated as mentally defective’ or previously
‘committed to a mental institution’” from purchasing a firearm.29 Such
individuals continue to commit gun violence, however.30 And though the
ineffectiveness of efforts to keep guns out of the hands of the dangerous
mentally ill may be due in part to inadequacies in their implementation,31
such measures would do little to stem the violence because the mentally ill
are responsible for only a small percentage of the violent crime in the
United States.32
Perfect prevention may succeed, however, where the punitive and
preventive states have failed by aiming to prevent the criminal conduct
underlying the violence.33 For instance, many perpetrators of gun violence
use guns that they do not legally possess.34 Some are stolen,35 while others
are obtained through “straw man” purchases where a person legally
26
See Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving
Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41, 43–45 (2000)
(providing examples of how mandatory firearm sentence enhancements have little or no impact on
decreasing gun violence); Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention
Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 223, 227–28, 260
(2007) (analyzing the efficacy of gun violence deterrence programs).
27
See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM USE BY OFFENDERS
1 (2002) [hereinafter FIREARM USE BY OFFENDERS] (reporting that approximately one-third of violent
offenders carried or used a firearm).
28
Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 561 (2012).
29
James B. Jacobs & Jennifer Jones, Keeping Firearms Out of the Hands of the Dangerously
Mentally Ill, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 388, 390 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2006 & Supp. II)).
30
See id. at 400–01, 405–07 (describing the mental health history of perpetrators of large-scale
killings with firearms).
31
See id. at 395–98 (arguing that the national database of those who are disqualified from buying
firearms due to mental illness is inadequate).
32
Richard A. Friedman, In Gun Debate, a Misguided Focus on Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2012, at D5.
33
Of course, one can also imagine fantastic technologies that would make gun violence
impossible, like smart bullets that break apart harmlessly before hitting a person. I will attempt,
however, to limit my discussion herein to technologies that are at least plausible.
34
See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 76 (Charles F.
Wellford et al. eds., 2005) (suggesting that research demonstrates that offenders “buy, borrow, sell, and
otherwise exchange guns quite frequently”).
35
Id. at 78.
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permitted to buy a firearm does so and passes it on to a person, such as a
felon, not lawfully entitled to own the weapon.36 The implementation of
so-called “smart gun” technologies, which make a gun capable of being
fired only by its lawful owner, could make it so that many violent criminals
would be unable to obtain a usable firearm.37 Similarly, technology exists
that could disable guns in public places where gun possession is illegal,
like schools, universities, and commercial establishments.38 If properly
implemented, this technology could prevent gun violence in those
locations, again by targeting underlying criminal conduct.
This is not to say that this technology could solve the gun violence
problem on its own. Only gun violence committed in certain places or
with illegally-obtained weapons would be curtailed. Additional legislative
steps, including closing loopholes in the licensing and sale process, would
still be needed.39 Older weapons lacking these technologies would need to
be removed from circulation or updated.40 And opponents of gun control
would certainly oppose the implementation of these new technologies.41
But the point remains that perfect prevention—technology aimed at
making criminal conduct practically impossible—could reduce instances of
gun violence that have resisted traditional prevention strategies.42
Some perfect prevention regimes are already in place. For example,
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
36

Id.
See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
549, 595–96 (2009) (describing the shift in political arguments around gun control); Nick Bilton, Smart
Guns Can’t Kill in the Wrong Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at B6 (discussing biometric and grip
detection technologies). Though such placement is not typically an indication of feasibility, a version
of this technology was featured in the most recent James Bond film, Skyfall. Joe Pappalardo, Fact vs.
Fiction: The Truth About Skyfall’s Weapons, POPULAR MECHANICS (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/digital/fact-vs-fiction/fact-vs-fiction-the-truth-aboutskyfalls-weapons-14544466.
38
See Bilton, supra note 37 (discussing technologies that limit gun violence).
39
See David Kairys, Self-Defense and Gun Regulation for All, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1669, 1676–77
(2013) (outlining the “gun-show loophole” that allows buyers who are not licensed dealers to legally
resell a firearm without doing a background check).
40
See Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder
Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 884–85 (2008) (raising the issue of retrofitting older guns
with new gun safety technology).
41
See Bilton, supra note 37 (describing gun manufacturer opposition to safety technologies);
Steve Friess, NRA: Smart Guns Are Plain Stupid, WIRED (Apr. 30, 2002),
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2002/04/52178 (same).
42
Efforts to reduce gun violence also face unique constitutional and political hurdles. The
Supreme Court invalidated a ban on handgun possession in the home, thereby recognizing an expanded
individual Second Amendment right to possess a firearm. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
594, 628–29, 635 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010)
(holding that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated against the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment). More recently, the Seventh Circuit held that the Second Amendment
prevented Illinois from banning the carrying of guns in public. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940–
42 (7th Cir. 2012).
37
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(DMCA) of 1998 make it illegal to develop technology that could be used
to circumvent technological protections on copyrighted material.43 By
causing such technologies to be unavailable, the DMCA aims to make
many kinds of copyright infringement practically impossible for the
average person.44 Other perfect prevention technologies are under
development.45 The Driver Alcohol Detection System for Safety, for
instance, is a joint project between the federal government and private
industry that would place technology in new vehicles to prevent their
operation when the driver is intoxicated.46
Though its feasibility has increased as technology has advanced and
become more central to criminal conduct, the idea of the State preventing
criminal conduct by making it essentially impossible is not a novel
concept. For more than three decades, the Situational Crime Prevention
(SCP) movement has advocated for crime prevention measures that make
crime more costly to commit.47 More recently, Neal Kumar Katyal has
discussed the use of architecture to prevent crime in spaces both real48 and
digital,49 and Edward Cheng has argued that in some circumstances
structure may be a better crime prevention tool than legislative fiat.50
Technologists have joined the party, too.51 Joel Reidenberg recognized
that the Internet created an opportunity for ex ante enforcement of legal
Lawrence Lessig’s famous claim that “[c]ode is law”
rules.52
43

17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2)(A) (2012).
See Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 9–11
(2006) (analyzing cases involving technological infringement and the impact of those decisions on
copyright law).
45
See, e.g., Rutgers Engineers Design Cell Phone App to Reduce Distracted Driving, RUTGERS
TODAY (July 29, 2012), http://news.rutgers.edu/medrel/research/rh-2012/rutgers-engineers-de20120726 (discussing smartphone apps that help to reduce driver distraction).
46
See Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795,
828–29 (2013) (discussing in detail the Driver Alcohol Detection System for Safety).
47
See Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST. 91, 110–11 (1995)
(discussing “target hardening” and “access control” measures to prevent crime).
48
Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1138–39 (2002).
49
Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261, 2263–64
(2003).
50
Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
655, 664–65 (2006).
51
In addition to those discussed in the text, a number of other legal scholars have recognized the
unique opportunities that technology presents to regulate private conduct. See, e.g., JULIE COHEN,
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 218
(2012) (“The geographies and architectures of networked space establish the material field for
processes of self-constitution.”); R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457,
493, 513 (2005) (“[T]he law-software equilibrium for a particular regulatory condition is generally
determined by private decisionmaking related to the costs and benefits of each regulatory effect (law
and software).”).
52
Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 581 (1998); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet
44
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acknowledged that the structure of the Internet can be used by powerful
interests to prevent unsavory conduct.53 Jonathan Zittrain warned that the
proliferation of “tethered appliances”—essentially computers connected to
networks that control and limit their operation—opens the door to the
“perfect enforcement” of legal rules.54
These scholars have recognized the (relatively untapped) potential of
technology to impose powerful, and sometimes unseen, restrictions on
conduct.55 They have also delineated some potential practical and legal
concerns with the implementation of such restrictions.56 But scholars thus
far have failed to situate the emergence of perfect preventive technologies
within relevant legal theories.57 Doing so is crucial. The political pressure
to prevent crime is enormous,58 and similar pressure can be expected in
support of using technology to prevent criminal conduct.59 In the context
of punishment and preventive detention, courts and scholars have
discussed exhaustively, if not conclusively, the balancing of these concerns
and the proper limitations on government authority that result.60
Examining the emerging perfect preventive state in the light of this
experience is necessary to identify limits on the use of perfect prevention
Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1966 (2005) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Technology and Internet
Jurisdiction] (further exploring the potential and limits of technological enforcement).
53
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (emphasis omitted); see
id. at 6–7 (demonstrating the significance of substantive value choices in constituting cyberspace).
54
ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 104–10.
55
See COHEN, supra note 51, at 156 (“Architectures of control are emerging gradually, in a
piecemeal, uncoordinated fashion, at points where the interests of powerful institutional actors align.”).
56
These concerns can be substantial and involve, inter alia, the monetary cost of such technology,
fairness issues arising from the distribution of these costs, and procedural due process concerns. See
Rich, supra note 46, at 843 (engaging in an economic analysis of perfect preventive technology); see
also Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 1965 (noting that
technological rule enforcement must comply with constitutional due process requirements).
57
See infra Part III.C.
58
See David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947, 1985–86
(2012) (explaining that some scholars blame the “unremitting expansion” of criminal law on a
“legislative process that exaggerates the temporary passions of the electorate”); Robinson, supra note 4,
at 1433–34 (discussing current crime rates such as violent crime, aggravated assault, and juvenile crime
to show that “political forces inevitably will press for protective measures if a perception of public
vulnerability exists,” and noting that “it is understandable that today’s citizens are demanding greater
protection and that legislators are seeking new ways to provide it”).
59
See Jack M. Balkin, Room for Maneuver: Julie Cohen’s Theory of Freedom in the Information
State, 6 JERUSALEM REV. L. STUD. 79, 94–95 (2012) (arguing that governments and businesses seek to
use technology to preserve their own interests, like intellectual property rights and data collection, but
these same governments and businesses want to keep “digital enforcement” moving toward “the
construction of a great two way mirror in which ordinary people’s lives are increasingly transparent to
powerful public and private entities that are not transparent to the people they view”).
60
See Steiker, supra note 4, at 773–74, 776–77 (noting some of the limits placed on the punitive
state, such as procedural protections in criminal proceedings, burden of proof requirements, and the
Fourth Amendment in contrast to the yet-to-be-defined and not-fully-examined limits on the preventive
state).
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before it becomes institutionalized.
This Article has three specific aims. First, it argues that perfect
prevention is a novel approach to crime prevention, different from
punishment and prevention in important ways that impact the proper limits
on its use. Second, it identifies potential concerns with the use of perfect
prevention and proposes limitations on the perfect preventive state that
respond to those concerns.
Third, it identifies areas for future
consideration of the perfect preventive state by scholars.
Part II defines the perfect preventive state and makes some important
observations about the implementation of perfect preventive technology.
Part III briefly discusses the punitive and preventive states and their
limitations, and explains why those limitations are inapplicable to the
perfect preventive state. This Part further compares the perfect preventive
state to precursors, such as SCP, and explains how advocates of these
precursors have failed to provide the theoretical foundation necessary to
develop limits on perfect prevention. Part IV identifies and assesses
possible objections to perfect prevention and explores potential substantive
limits to address those concerns. Specifically, Part IV addresses the impact
of perfect prevention on individual autonomy, concerns raised by the equal
application of perfect prevention, and the question of whether and when
perfect prevention should be the preferred approach to preventing certain
criminal conduct. Part V concludes by identifying issues relating to perfect
prevention that remain for further exploration.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE PERFECT PREVENTIVE STATE
This Part deals with two preliminary issues. First, it defines perfect
prevention. Second, it makes further relevant observations about how
perfect prevention works.
A. Defining Perfect Prevention
Perfect prevention seeks to prevent all instances of certain targeted
criminal conduct by rendering that conduct practically impossible. This
definition incorporates four requirements for a crime prevention tool to be
part of the perfect preventive state. The first is that it requires government
action; conversely, it does not include private self-help. A government
directive that all homeowners put bars on ground-floor windows to prevent
break-ins would be part of the perfect preventive state. A private
homeowner choosing to put bars on the ground-floor windows of her home
to prevent burglaries would not. Perfect prevention is limited to only
government directives because the State’s involvement implicates
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individual liberty interests where private action does not.
Note that actions by the State that fall short of directly mandating the
implementation of preventive technology are still tools of perfect
prevention.
For instance, unauthorized duplication of copyrighted
materials is a crime,62 but the federal government does not require
copyright owners to implement any specific technology to prevent such
copying.63 Rather, the DMCA criminalizes the creation of means to
circumvent whatever technological protection measures that copyright
owners choose to implement.64 In doing so, the DMCA aims to make the
tools of circumvention unavailable to the general public.65 Without those
tools, the criminal conduct of unauthorized duplication becomes practically
impossible for the average person. Thus, the DMCA’s anti-circumvention
provisions are part of the perfect preventive state even though they do not
mandate the use of preventive technology.66
The second notable characteristic of the perfect preventive state is that
it targets criminal conduct instead of specific potential criminals. Laws
that require that all convicted drunk drivers install ignition interlocks that
prevent operation of their automobiles absent a clean breath sample are not
part of the perfect preventive state, because they target only the subset of
61
Freedom and liberty, after all, are defined in relation to government, rather than private,
restraint. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from
unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. . . . Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”);
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166,
169–71, 178 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (defining negative and positive liberty in terms of the
relationship between the individual and the government and the amount of interference from the
government or outside forces). Thus, while a private homeowner’s decision to place a high fence
around her property to keep out burglars would not intrude on anyone’s liberty interest, a government
mandate that all private property be surrounded by such a fence certainly would. See Larry Alexander
& Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637, 641
(2012) (discussing the practice of protection as a “technique for dealing with dangerous persons,”
explaining that fences are a form of protection because they are designed to make criminal conduct
impossible or undesirable, and arguing that protection does not interfere with the liberty rights of others
because the “would-be burglar has no right that our property not be surrounded by a high fence . . . .
[and] no right that we make his planned violation of our rights easy or safe”).
62
See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be
punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18.”). For a history of the criminalization of copyright
infringement, see Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1705, 1706–12 (1999).
63
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3) (“Nothing in this section shall require that the design of, or design
and selection of parts and components for, a consumer electronics, telecommunications, or a computing
product provide for a response to any particular technological measure . . . .”).
64
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
65
Cohen, supra note 44, at 7.
66
Polk Wagner describes the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions as an example of “legal
preemption” by which the law addresses the regulatory effect of software. Wagner, supra note 51, at
485. Wagner’s legal preemption and perfect prevention overlap where the law uses the regulatory
power of code with the aim of making criminal conduct practically impossible.
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the population deemed most likely to commit the offense of drunk
driving.67 On the other hand, a law requiring all cars be manufactured with
a similar ignition interlock system would be part of the perfect preventive
state, because it would aim to prevent all instances of the targeted criminal
conduct, regardless of the specific criminal proclivities of the actor.
The third defining characteristic of the perfect preventive state is that it
aims to eliminate the targeted criminal conduct by making the conduct
practically impossible, rather than merely inadvisable. The distinction
here is both temporal and a matter of degree. Thus, government efforts to
detect crime after the fact, like cameras that photograph the license plates
of vehicles that run a red light, are not part of the perfect preventive state.
Instead, these efforts try to increase the efficacy of the punitive state by
enhancing deterrence.68 The perfect preventive state may tackle the same
problem through in-vehicle technology that detects a red light and
automatically stops the vehicle before it enters the intersection.69
However, the ex ante nature of a measure is not sufficient to situate it
squarely in the perfect preventive state. The measure must also seek to
increase the difficulty of committing the crime so as to not only deter the
potential criminal but to simply frustrate her.70 Take, for example, a statute
requiring convenience stores to install drop safes that allow employees to
deposit money but prevent them from taking it out in the event of a
robbery.71 A drop safe increases the time and effort a would-be robber
must expend to steal a substantial amount of money from the store, which
in turn gives police more time to respond and increases the likelihood of
apprehension. From this perspective, the drop safe requirement is a tool of
the punitive state, because it aims to deter crime by convincing potential
67
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179.3(g5) (2012) (detailing how North Carolina’s “ignition
interlock” law applies to individuals who have had their drivers licenses revoked for drunk driving).
68
See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1208
(2012) (“One purpose of overt surveillance is to affect the behavior of those being watched, to assure
that individual behavior conforms to societal norms.”).
69
See John Markoff & Somini Sengupta, Drivers with Hands Full Get a Backup: The Car, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, at A1 (explaining similar technology that automatically slows or stops the car
when a pedestrian or cyclist is in the path, making it so drivers will no longer “have to worry about car
crashes and collisions” because the movement of the car will be out of their control).
70
See Cheng, supra note 50, at 664 (“Viewed from a would-be defendant’s perspective, there is a
difference between being able to do something but knowing that you will likely get caught . . . and not
being able to do it at all.”).
71
See, e.g., HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 28-408 (2013) (requiring convenience stores in
Houston, Texas, to “have a drop safe on the premises to keep the amount of cash available to
employees to a minimum”). Edward Cheng uses the example of metal post boxes to illustrate a similar
point. See Cheng, supra note 50, at 664 (“[W]ith the mailbox, the fact that a would-be mail thief must
now spend additional time picking the mailbox lock or carry conspicuous welding equipment to cut the
steel makes the thief more vulnerable to detection.”). I eschew this example because the governmental
origins of the U.S. Postal Service raise the murky issue of whether the use of such mailboxes
constitutes a government mandate or private self-help.
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criminals that if they try to rob a convenience store they will either steal
very little money or get caught. But if the mandated drop safe is so secure
that accessing its contents is practically impossible, then it becomes a tool
of the perfect preventive state. The point at which a measure stops being
punishment and becomes perfect prevention is not amenable to clear
definition.72 The critical point, though, is that there is a point at which a
measure makes criminal conduct so costly and difficult to achieve that it no
longer seeks to deter but instead aims to frustrate those who might engage
in the conduct by making it practically impossible to do so.73
The fourth and final defining characteristic of the perfect preventive
state is that it targets criminal conduct for prevention. The State of course
could theoretically mandate the use of technology to prevent any harmful
conduct, whether that conduct has been legislatively defined as criminal or
But when the legislature defines conduct as criminal, it
not.74
communicates moral condemnation of conduct that is so unacceptable and
deleterious to society’s interests that the conduct is not just discouraged but
forbidden.75 Civil sanctions, on the other hand, lack that moral element76
and thus do not define forbidden conduct as much as they place a cost on
conduct that society wishes to discourage.77 The State’s interest in
preventing criminal conduct is therefore subject to the narrowest
limitations.78 By the same token, the limitations on the State’s ability to
prevent criminal conduct will apply with equal or greater force when the
State seeks to prevent non-criminal conduct.79 Consequently, limiting our
consideration to technologies that aim to prevent criminal conduct allows
us to identify limitations that also apply to the State’s use of technology to
72

See Cheng, supra note 50, at 664 (acknowledging that the difference may smack of “splitting

hairs”).
73

Id.
See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 108 (recognizing that one could seek to “design[] against” any
“undesirable conduct” and providing examples of technological preemption of conduct).
75
See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV 515, 538 (2000)
(“Law, particularly criminal law, also serves an educational function—to express boundaries between
the acceptable (but possibly distasteful) and the forbidden—illuminating the border and suggesting that
the public steer clear.”); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 729, 731 (1990) (“The rules of conduct function [of the criminal law] gives the general
population ex ante direction as to what they can, must, and must not do.”).
76
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404
(1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). But see Carol S. Steiker, Punishment
and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 782–
84 (1997) (discussing the breakdown in the distinction between criminal and civil regulations).
77
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105–06 (1972) (discussing how
regulating entitlements helps society solve internal conflicts).
78
See Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 1965 (explaining the
internal constitutional and public policy limits on the use of state power).
79
See Hart, supra note 76, at 404 (explaining the difference between criminal and civil sanctions).
74
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prevent non-criminal conduct.
B. One Disclaimer and Two Additional Observations
Now that we have defined perfect prevention, one disclaimer and two
interrelated, non-definitional observations are helpful to understand how
perfect prevention works. The disclaimer is that perfect prevention is not
so named because it does, or even can, prevent all instances of the targeted
criminal conduct. Technology inevitably fails,80 and the resourcefulness of
motivated criminals knows few limits.81 Instead, the “perfect” in perfect
prevention comes from its goal of preventing all instances of that conduct.
This quest for the elimination of all criminal conduct distinguishes the
perfect preventive state from punishment and prevention. The punitive
state serves both utilitarian and retributive functions, and thus punishment
is not calibrated to achieve perfect deterrence of all crime.82 Even if it
were, some crimes and criminals cannot be deterred.83 Similarly, because
prevention targets only those most likely to commit crime, it would not
prevent all instances of criminal conduct even if it could flawlessly identify
those people.84 Perfect prevention seeks to wipe out certain criminal
conduct entirely, and even if it can never quite succeed, the sweeping aim
has unique implications that demand exploration.85
The first observation is that, like any structural regulation, the perfect
preventive state can, but need not, operate non-transparently. Physical
architecture can regulate conduct non-transparently by simply removing
choices, thus making it so that the targets of regulation do not even know
that their choices have been constrained.86 Similarly, the “tethered
appliances” discussed by Jonathan Zittrain often do not reveal the conduct
80
See Rich, supra note 46 (describing the inevitable errors in perfect preventive technology);
Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 1965 (noting that technological
enforcement of laws is inevitably imperfect).
81
See Cheng, supra note 50, at 691 (noting that if the State required speed governors on all new
vehicles, the “governors could be disconnected or otherwise disabled”); Cohen, supra note 44, at 41
(“Technically-skilled risk-takers will be able to hack the code, defeat the watchers, and nurture thriving
darknets.”).
82
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.1.2 (2013) (delineating the purposes of
sentencing as “deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation”).
83
Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1243 (1985).
84
See id. (explaining that because courts cannot obtain perfect information about individuals and
their acts, “[t]he courts . . . cannot employ [appropriate] sanctions”).
85
See COHEN, supra note 51, at 175 (recognizing that imperfect structural constraints can have an
“effect on the everyday lives of network users”).
86
See Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 1, 7 (2004–2005) (“Architectural regulation . . . structures the conditions of action, e.g., social
settings and/or the resources available in those settings. It thus regulates the behavior that occurs in
those settings or that utilizes those resources.”).
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or action that they restrict. And even when regulation is evident, the
parameters governing what conduct is permitted and what conduct is
forbidden may not be.88 Finally, structural regulation can obscure who is
responsible for the limitations on individual action.89
Yet opacity is not a necessary feature of structural regulation generally,
or perfect prevention specifically.90 The government can choose to reveal
its role in regulating conduct and specify, or at least not obscure, the
conduct it means to prevent, its reasons for doing so, and the means
necessary to accomplish that goal. The fact that perfect prevention can be
transparent or obscure does not tell us whether transparency is good or bad
or what kind of transparency should be preferred—there will be more on
that later91—but the important point for now is that the transparency of
perfect prevention is often a design decision.
Second, the use of perfect prevention to frustrate criminal conduct is
most plausible where the targeted criminal conduct is dependent upon or
enabled by some technological intermediary.92 When criminal conduct
depends on technology, the State can prevent the criminal conduct by
either restricting the availability of the technology altogether or by
mandating limitations on the capacity of the enabling technology to allow
criminal conduct.93
The Undetectable Firearms Act of 198894 is an example of the former
approach,95 as it criminalizes the manufacture, importation, or possession
87

ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 107–09.
See James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1736 (2005)
(describing how physical architecture is “ambiguous”).
89
See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501, 541–43 (1999) (discussing secret government regulation and its potential role in society today);
Tien, supra note 86, at 6–8 (providing examples of how many architectural regulations leave unknown
the source of the regulation).
90
See Katyal, supra note 49, at 2284–85 (noting that some forms of government regulation are
more transparent than others).
91
See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
92
See LESSIG, supra note 53, at 49 (noting that in the context of copyright violations, “regulating
users alone would be difficult but regulating the code that users use would not be as difficult”).
93
See Wagner, supra note 51, at 485–86 (discussing other examples of this regulatory technique).
When the government dictates that producers of technology put limitations on its use, these limitations
legitimize Lawrence Lessig’s famous, and often criticized, aphorism, “Code is law.” LESSIG, supra
note 53, at 6; see also Grimmelmann, supra note 88, at 1721 (“[C]ode does the work of law, but does it
in an architectural way.”); Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 57 (2007)
(“[C]ode is digital ‘architecture’ that does the work of law, but is not law, qua law.” (quoting
Grimmelmann, supra note 88, at 1721)).
94
18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2012).
95
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, see supra notes 43–44 and accompanying
text, and the Audio Home Recording Act, which required that digital audio recording devices
“incorporate technological controls to block second-generation digital copies,” Peter S. Menell &
David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework
and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143, 163 (2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000)),
88
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of a firearm that cannot be detected by a metal detector or x-ray machine.96
That ban makes other criminal conduct, like the unauthorized possession of
a firearm on an airplane,97 practically impossible for the general public
who lacks the expertise to manufacture such a firearm themselves.98
Examples of the latter approach include government mandates that Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) prevent their customers from accessing websites
that contain child pornography, as the State directly limits the technology
that one might use to engage in the criminal conduct of possessing child
pornography.99
Though perfect prevention more easily targets those crimes that
depend upon a technological intermediary for their commission, it is not
necessarily so limited. Chemical castration already aims to deprive
individuals of their capacity to experience sexual desire or to engage in
criminal sexual activity.100 Other pharmaceuticals target antisocial and
racist thought processes.101 These advances presage the potential to make
more “traditional” crimes like rape or murder practically impossible by
limiting an individual’s capacity to form the desire to commit the targeted
offense.
III. THE PERFECT PREVENTIVE STATE IS DIFFERENT
The first important claim of this Article is that perfect prevention is
different from punishment and prevention in ways that make the
limitations placed on the punitive and preventive states inapposite to the
perfect preventive state. This Part develops that claim by addressing the
punishment and prevention in turn. It then discusses perfect prevention’s
are other examples of the State preventing criminal conduct by restricting access to enabling
technology.
96
18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1).
97
See 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b) (2012) (criminalizing the concealed carry of firearms on an aircraft).
98
See Cory Doctorow, Congressman Calls for Ban on 3D Printed Guns, BOING BOING (Dec. 9,
2012), http://boingboing.net/2012/12/09/congressman-calls-for-ban-on-3.html (suggesting that the
Undetectable Firearms Act may require manufacturers of three-dimensional printers to make it
impossible for their devices to be used to make plastic firearms).
99
See Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values and
Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1123, 1136–37 (2011) (discussing the use of this
approach internationally).
100
See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth
Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS. L. REV. 559, 573 (2006) (discussing
how the chemical castration drug MPA reduces the brain’s exposure to testosterone, which results in a
suppression of sexual desires that creates sexual apathy toward both deviant and non-deviant sexual
acts).
101
See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness:
Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 321 n.125 (2006) (recognizing
the potential for drug therapy to suppress abnormal responses and desires); Sylvia Terbeck et al.,
Propranolol Reduces Implicit Negative Racial Bias, 222 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 419, 420, 422 (2012)
(finding that the drug propranolol significantly reduced implicit racial bias).
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similarity to precursors like the SCP movement, which seeks to prevent
crime through changes to the environment. Finally, it discusses how
scholars have failed to develop sufficient justifications for, and limitations
on, these precursors.
A. Perfect Prevention Is Not Punishment
The punitive state imposes some unpleasantness on individuals who
violate the State’s criminal laws.102 The task of identifying the specific
contours of punishment’s justification has long occupied scholars, with
various versions of retributivism and utilitarianism occupying the field.103
A common thread in both retributive and utilitarian theories is that
punishment can be justified only where the target of punishment has been
adjudicated guilty of some crime.104 For the retributivist, the past offense
requirement strictly delineates when and how much punishment is
appropriate: an individual’s moral desert justifies and limits the
punishment the State may impose, in that the State should punish the
criminal as much, and only as much, as she deserves to be punished.105
The utilitarian account’s relationship to a finding of guilt is more
complex.106 Under this approach, punishment is justified only to the extent
that its social benefit—in the form of specific deterrence, general
deterrence, rehabilitation, or other social good—exceeds the harm it
causes.107 Many retributivists criticize utilitarianism because it might
justify the punishment of an innocent individual for an offense committed
by another or for an offense that never occurred.108 But even if the
102
See H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 4 (1968) (defining punishment as something
that must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant); Kent Greenawalt,
Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 343–44 (1983) (“In typical cases of punishment,
persons who possess authority impose designedly unpleasant consequences upon, and express their
condemnation of, other persons who are capable of choice and who have breached established
standards of behavior.”).
103
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454
(1997) (discussing the broad grounds on which criminal punishment can be justified and the various
versions of utilitarianism and retributivism).
104
See Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 17 (2006)
(discussing both retributive and utilitarian punishment as they apply to the “offender”).
105
See id. at 16–17 (emphasizing the desirability of apportioning the severity of punishment to the
offenders’ blameworthiness).
106
See id. at 17–18 (discussing the utilitarian calculation of punishment that could justify a very
serious punishment imposed “on an offender who committed a venial offense, or . . . on an innocent
person whom everyone except the judge believed to be guilty”).
107
See id. (explaining that the only constraint on punishment is the principle that no punishment
should cause greater harm than it prevents).
108
See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 93
n.19 (1997) (“The main problem with the pure utilitarian theory of punishment is that it potentially
sacrifices the innocent in order to achieve a collective good.”).
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utilitarian account would allow for punishment of the innocent—a
concession few utilitarians are willing to make—a finding that the
punished individual committed some past offense, real or imagined, is still
a necessary predicate of the punishment.109
With this in mind, perfect prevention obviously cannot be justified on
the same grounds as punishment or limited by the same principles. Perfect
prevention restricts individual liberty before the criminal act occurs. Thus,
there is no past offense and no moral desert to provide the threshold
justification for the intrusion on liberty.
Likewise, punishment’s
requirement of proportionality to moral desert provides no limitation on the
perfect preventive state.
B. Perfect Prevention Is Not Prevention
The preventive state “attempt[s] to identify and neutralize dangerous
individuals before they commit crimes by restricting their liberty in a
variety of ways.”110 Prevention has a long history, with the civil
commitment of the dangerous and mentally ill tracing its roots back to
common law.111 It has come into vogue recently as federal and state
governments have sought to expand their authority to civilly commit
sexually-violent predators and terrorists.112 The liberty restrictions
employed by the preventive state can range both in terms of severity and
time, from the brief detention for police questioning authorized by Terry v.
Ohio113 to potentially indefinite incarceration114 or even death.115
The preventive state’s authority derives from the government’s police

109
See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1105
(1952) (recognizing that “invocation of a penal sanction necessarily depends on past behavior” even
when “the object is control of harmful conduct in the future”).
110
Steiker, supra note 4, at 774.
111
See Klein, supra note 28, at 566–67 (“Under the common law, dangerousness was a necessary
finding for civil commitment. People were confined if mad and dangerous; those who were mad but
not dangerous remained in the community.” (footnotes omitted)).
112
See Robert M. Chesney, supra note 11, at 26 (discussing the Justice and Defense Departments’
incapacitation of suspected terrorists through military and criminal detention); Eric S. Janus, The
Preventive State, Terrorists and Sexual Predators: Countering the Threat of a New Outsider
Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576, 576–77 (2004) (discussing radical prevention, which seeks to
intervene when there is a risk of future harm and does so by curtailing a person’s liberty before harm
results).
113
392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
114
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (holding the potentially indefinite
detention of sexually violent predators to be constitutional).
115
Though no state permits the implementation of the death penalty solely on the basis of a
finding of future dangerousness, the Supreme Court has approved of the use of future dangerousness as
a factor to be considered in capital sentencing. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); see also
Robinson, supra note 4, at 1430 n.4 (listing jurisdictions that consider dangerousness in sentencing).
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power to ensure public safety. This justification provides the first of two
substantive limits on the preventive state: the State must establish that the
individual who is subject to a preventive intrusion on her liberty is
dangerous.117 The range in severity of possible intrusions from the
preventive state correlates to the finding of dangerousness required to
justify the intrusion.118 Preventive detention, which interferes with the
“individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint,” is justified under the due process clause upon a finding of
volitional impairment and dangerousness pursuant to “proper procedures
and evidentiary standards.”119 Meanwhile, a Terry stop, during which a
person is restrained for only a brief period of time,120 is justified upon mere
reasonable suspicion that the target is or has been engaged in criminal
activity.121
The second substantive limitation on the preventive state cabins its use
to narrow subcategories of the dangerous, including pretrial detainees,
immigrants facing deportation, and the mentally ill.122 If there is a single
unifying justification for how to define the categories of dangerous people
who are subject to prevention, it is that the threat they pose to public safety
116
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“[T]he state also has authority under its
police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”).
This is actually an oversimplification, as the police power belongs only to the states, United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring), while the federal government’s
authority to prevent crime must derive from its enumerated powers, see id. at 1956 (majority opinion)
(concluding that the Federal Government’s enumerated powers grant Congress legislative power
sufficient to enact a law that allows a district court to order civil commitment of a mentally ill, sexually
dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date he would otherwise be released). This distinction is of little
practical significance in this context, as the federal government’s preventive authority generally derives
from concerns about public safety that relate to its specifically enumerated powers. See id. at 1959–60
(discussing the history of civil commitment under federal law and the animating concern that mentally
ill and dangerous former federal prisoners might threaten public safety).
117
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 (“States have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the
forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a
danger to the public health and safety. We have consistently upheld such involuntary commitment
statutes provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards.”
(citations omitted)). Of course, all people can be said to be “dangerous” in the sense that any conscious
person is physically capable of engaging in violent crime at any moment. At the same time, every
person is entitled to a presumption of harmlessness, and the State therefore bears the burden of making
some individualized showing of dangerousness before preemptively restricting an individual’s liberty.
See Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive
Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 804–05 (1996) (arguing that it is necessary to show
culpability to make a finding of dangerousness).
118
See Slobogin, supra note 14, at 50–53 (proposing a “proportionality principle” to govern the
amount of dangerousness that must be proven to justify preventive action).
119
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356–57.
120
See United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that during a
Terry stop, an officer may only ask “a moderate number of questions”).
121
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
122
See Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice,
2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85, 87 (2011) (cataloguing examples of preventive detention).
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123

cannot be deterred adequately by the punitive state.
Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that the State can civilly commit sexual predators only if
they have some mental illness or abnormality that creates a “serious
difficulty in controlling behavior.”124 Similarly, pretrial detention solves a
problem—flight by dangerous individuals charged with serious crimes—
for which ex post punishment is ill-suited; after all, when a defendant flees,
she cannot be punished for either the underlying offense or the subsequent
crime of flight.125
This limitation does not derive from, and indeed undermines, the
public safety justification for the preventive state, as the public would be
safer if all dangerous people were preventively detained. Instead, the
Supreme Court has explained that the requirement of mental illness is
necessary in the sexual predator context to ensure that prevention does not
“‘become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence’—functions
properly those of criminal law.”126 In other words, it ensures that ex post
punishment remains the preferred avenue for preventing crime.127 This
preference is based on the understanding that punishment better respects
individual autonomy by restricting liberty only after an individual has
chosen to break the law.128
Neither limitation on the preventive state provides useful guidance for
the proper implementation of perfect prevention, however. First, because
perfect prevention targets only criminal conduct, it by definition advances
the State’s interest in public safety and falls within the State’s police
power.129 Consequently, there is no need for an additional limitation on
perfect prevention, like the dangerousness limitation on the preventive
state, to ensure that perfect prevention serves the State’s interest in
protecting its citizens. Second, the limitation of prevention to only those
individuals who cannot be handled adequately by the punitive state is
inapposite to perfect prevention. Perfect prevention targets criminal
conduct no matter who engages in it and does not limit specific classes of

123
See id. at 88 (claiming that “American law eschews [preventive detention] except where
legislatures and courts deem it necessary to prevent grave public harms”).
124
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409, 412–13 (2002).
125
Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 86–87.
126
Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372–73 (1997)); see also
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (noting that a “lack of volitional control” adequately distinguished the
detainee “from other dangerous persons who [were] perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively
through criminal proceedings”).
127
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
128
See Ferzan, supra note 3, at 152–53 (explaining that theorists “decry the denial of the potential
offender’s autonomy” when “we wish to substantially interfere with an individual’s liberty to prevent
him from harming us”).
129
See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894) (noting that “[t]he police power . . . is
universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safety”).
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individuals.
Moreover, it is not immediately obvious that punishment is
more respectful of autonomy than perfect prevention, and thus there is no
per se preference for punishment over perfect prevention.131
C. Predecessors of Perfect Prevention
The idea of preventing crime by removing criminal conduct from the
range of choices available to the potential criminal is not new. For
example, the SCP movement seeks to “reduce the opportunities for crime
and increase its risks” through the “management, design, or manipulation
of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent a way as
possible.”132 In a similar vein, Neal Kumar Katyal discusses the use of
architecture for the purposes of crime control by focusing on four
architectural mechanisms: natural surveillance, territoriality, building
Katyal also argues for
community, and strengthening targets.133
consideration of analogous mechanisms to prevent cybercrime.134
Meanwhile, Edward Cheng contends that the government should use
structure to prevent crimes like speeding and music piracy.135
These structural and architectural approaches to crime control overlap
in part with perfect prevention in that they involve generally applicable
State mandates that aim to make specific criminal conduct practically
impossible, rather than merely costly. For instance, more than forty years
ago John Decker studied the effectiveness of new parking meters in New
York City that aimed to prevent the illegal use of “slugs” instead of coins
in the meters.136 The meters were a success, markedly reducing the
targeted criminal activity,137 and an advocate of SCP rightly trumpets the
anti-slug meters as a success story of “[t]arget [h]ardening.”138 The meters
also are an example of perfect prevention: they were installed by the
130
One can imagine a hybrid between prevention and perfect prevention that aims to make it
practically impossible for specific individuals to engage in targeted criminal conduct, but consideration
of such an approach is outside the scope of this Article. See infra Part IV.
131
The nature and extent of perfect prevention’s intrusion on individual liberty and the proper
preference between punishment and prevention are both explored in more detail below. See supra
Parts IV.A, IV.C.
132
Clarke, supra note 47, at 91.
133
See Katyal, supra note 48, at 1048, 1050–71 (describing “Natural Surveillance,”
“Territoriality,” “Building Community,” and “Strengthening Targets”).
134
See Katyal, supra note 49, at 2286 (suggesting the use of software and performance standards
to enforce cybersecurity).
135
See Cheng, supra note 50, at 689, 691–92, 694, 703–14 (suggesting structures such as “copy
protection technology”).
136
John F. Decker, Curbside Deterrence? An Analysis of the Effect of a Slug-Rejector Device,
Coin-View Window and Warning Labels on Slug Usage in New York City Parking Meters, 10
CRIMINOLOGY 127, 128–29 (1972).
137
Id. at 133.
138
Clarke, supra note 47, at 110.
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government, they target criminal conduct, and they seek to make the
targeted conduct practically impossible.139
But even though perfect prevention has a long history under the
umbrellas of SCP and architectural or structural crime control, scholarly
attention to the proper limits of the government’s power to mandate the use
of crime prevention technologies has been scant. This failure is
attributable in part to inherent characteristics of perfect prevention. First,
structural controls aim to prevent only criminal conduct,140 and few goals
are more politically palatable than crime prevention.141 Second, structural
controls do not intrude on individual liberty in the obvious fashions of
prevention and punishment.142 Thus, structural regulations are easy to laud
as a solution to the problems caused by these more traditional crimeprevention methods.143 Third, the crime reduction benefits of structural
controls are statistically quantifiable,144 but the impact of perfect
prevention on individual liberty is diffuse and indeterminate as everyone is
prevented from doing something—committing a crime—that they have no
right to do in the first place.145 As a result, it is easy to trumpet the
successes of structural crime control while giving little attention to the
potential downsides and proper limitations.146
Nonetheless, some scholars have grappled with the downsides of the
perfect preventive state, even though most have fallen short of suggesting

139

Decker, supra note 136, at 131.
See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 48, at 1041 (“[A]dditional attention to cities, neighborhoods, and
individual buildings can reduce criminal activity.”).
141
See, e.g., Darren DaRonco, Ex-Tucson Mayoral Hopeful Plans Free Shotguns for High-Crime
Areas, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar. 27, 2013, at State and Regional News (showing that crime prevention
is so popular that a politician has proposed, as his political platform, providing free shotguns to
residents to prevent crime). But see Steven P. Lab, Crime Prevention, Politics, and the Art of Going
Nowhere Fast, 21 JUST. Q. 681, 682–84 (2004) (arguing that politicians focus on arresting, prosecuting,
and punishing offenders instead of activities “designed to reduce the actual level of crime” because
“crime prevention . . . is not politically expedient”).
142
See supra Part II.B.
143
See Cheng, supra note 50, at 664–65 (“Because structure . . . is largely self-executing, it
minimizes many of the problems that plague fiat regimes.”).
144
See, e.g., id. at 677–78 (arguing for the success of structural controls on tax evasion by
pointing to data about the revenue lost due to noncompliance for various income categories); Katyal,
supra note 48, at 1070 (trumpeting the success of traffic barriers in certain areas of Los Angeles that
reduced assaults “from 190 to 163 in the first year, and from 163 to 138 in the next year”).
145
See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 641 (arguing that making crime more difficult
to commit “does not interfere with the rightful liberty” of potential criminals); Corrado, supra note 117,
at 808 (“Exclusion from someone else’s property is likewise not a denial of anything the actor has a
right to—particularly if his only reason for being there would be to harm another.”).
146
See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 47, at 134–35 (discussing “supposed infringements of
constitutional liberties” resulting from SCP); Barry Poyner, What Works in Crime Prevention: An
Overview of Evaluations, 1 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 13, 15–16 (1993) (rating studies of SCP
techniques on the sole basis of whether they showed a reduction in crime).
140
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concrete limitations on government power.
Katyal, for instance,
recognized that architectural crime prevention techniques may raise
concerns about social control and individual privacy.148 His response to
these concerns is two-fold. First, he encourages government action to
enhance privacy.149 Second, Katyal argues that regulation through
architecture is inevitable and that government use of architecture is
preferable to private action because it “can be more responsible and far
more transparent than private decisionmaking.”150 Both points are valid, as
far as they go,151 but neither addresses how to ensure that the perfect
preventive state is not misused. Similarly, Cheng analyzed how structural
crime control might threaten individual interests in privacy and
autonomy,152 but he avoided the question of limits on perfect prevention.
Instead, he ultimately concluded that “a greater use of structural laws
would in fact require a shift in democratic values” away from individual
rights and toward communitarian interests.153
However, the same characteristics that make perfect prevention
resistant to scholarly criticism also highlight the need for discussion of
proper limitations on it. Like the preventive and punitive states, perfect
prevention is justified by the government’s obligation to protect the
public.154 Public safety garners strong political support, thus creating a
push to expand government authority to prevent crime. In the context of
punishment and prevention, this push is counterbalanced to some extent by
concern about the infringement on individual liberties. Criminal legal
theory provides a rich source for discussion of individual liberties in the
context of crime control, but few theorists have seriously tackled the
147
See Rich, supra note 46, at 805–28 (cataloguing costs and benefits of perfect preventive
measures).
148
Katyal, supra note 48, at 1128–33.
149
For example, Katyal suggests the creation of “semipublic spaces that mediate the tension
between an atomized group of individuals and a collective and undifferentiated mass.” Id. at 1129.
150
Id. at 1132.
151
Certainly, in an ideal world governments will act to maximize individual privacy and minimize
invidious social control and will do so with maximum transparency, but recent experience teaches that
limitations on government power are necessary. See, e.g., Charlie Savage et al., U.S. Confirms That It
Gathers Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013, at A1 (discussing acknowledgement by the
United States government that it collected massive amounts of data on domestic and foreign phone
calls).
152
See Cheng, supra note 50, at 669–73 (exploring whether “the legislative aversion to structural
laws may derive from concerns about their impact on personal freedom” in the context of “surveillance
and violations of privacy”).
153
Id. at 671.
154
See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Orders: A Problem of
Undercriminalization?, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 59, 71 (R.A. Duff et al. eds.,
2010) (“The ostensible rationale for such [preventive] measures is usually claimed to reside in
protecting the public or averting risk of harm, not in past wrongdoing.”); Katyal, supra note 48, at 1046
(calling on “government [to] draw upon all constraints on crime . . . to have maximum impact”).
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question of how perfect prevention might intrude on these liberties and
when such intrusion might be justified.155 Instead, some view prevention
of criminal conduct as a brick on the road to a science-fiction dystopia,156
while others scoff at the idea that perfect prevention would intrude on any
meaningful rights.157 A thoughtful consideration of the impact of perfect
prevention on individual rights is needed instead to counterbalance the
politically-attractive goal of crime prevention and to help trace some limits
on the proper scope of its use.158
IV. LIMITS ON THE PERFECT PREVENTIVE STATE
This Part identifies three concerns that might be raised with the use of
perfect prevention and discusses limits on the perfect preventive state that
respond to those concerns. The first concern is that perfect prevention
interferes with individual autonomy. The second concern is that by
treating everyone the same, perfect prevention treats all people like
criminals. The third concern asks whether and in what circumstances
perfect prevention should be preferred over punishment or prevention as a
means of preventing certain criminal conduct.
A. The Autonomy Concern
The punitive and preventive states are subject to substantive and
procedural due process limitations because they impinge on individual
liberty.159 For instance, the State can punish an individual only if it had
placed the individual on notice that her conduct was forbidden,160 provided
proper procedural protections to the individual in finding her guilty of the
155
See Andrew von Hirsch & Clifford Shearing, Exclusion from Public Space, in ETHICAL AND
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 77, 82–85 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds.,
2000) (arguing that situational crime prevention should respect an individual’s liberty of movement).
156
See Husak, supra note 2, at 215–16 (discussing the difficulties of social control).
157
See Marcus Felson & Ronald V. Clarke, The Ethics of Situational Crime Prevention, in
RATIONAL CHOICE AND SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 197, 208
(Graeme Newman et al. eds., 1997) (“It is remarkable to us that situational prevention should draw
criticism for neglecting individual rights when the most usual alternative is to try harder to arrest
people and remove their freedom altogether.”).
158
See Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 154, at 73–74 (“[W]hat matters in a society that is—or
wishes to . . . become—a liberal democracy is not that we control crime but how we do so.” (quoting
Ian Loader, The Anti-Politics of Crime, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 399, 405 (2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
159
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (“[I]t is the
State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the
‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause.”); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”).
160
See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1964) (presenting the “basic principle
that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that makes it a crime”).
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offense, and chose a punishment for the criminal conduct that was
proportional to the crime.162 Similarly, the State can use the tools of the
preventive state only upon a proper individualized finding that the target of
the State’s power endangers society’s interests.163 In either case, the
substantive and procedural limitations on the State’s power are roughly
proportional to the extent of the resulting interference with the individual’s
autonomy. In the punitive context, this explains why entitlement to a jury
trial or the assistance of counsel depends on the extent of the deprivation of
liberty to which the defendant may be subject.164 And the State’s burden of
proving an individual’s dangerousness increases in proportion to the extent
of the proposed preventive deprivation of her liberty.165
But what is obvious about punishment and prevention—that they must
be subject to limitations because they intrude on legitimate exercises of
individual autonomy—is not so clear with respect to perfect prevention.166
Even in their most limited applications, both the punitive and preventive
states engage in “blunderbuss interventions”167 on liberty, by which an
individual is deprived of the freedom to engage in a wide swath of legal
activity in order to prevent criminal conduct.168 For instance, in a punitive
or preventive state, an individual who is imprisoned or preventively
detained is prevented from committing most crimes, but she also loses the
freedom to see friends, travel, or shop at the grocery store. Perfect
prevention, on the other hand, aims to prevent individuals from engaging
in criminal conduct and only criminal conduct.169 This makes perfect
161

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing rights to trial and confrontation of witnesses).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008).
163
See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the federal government
uses its preventive authority to protect societal interests).
164
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (requiring that counsel be provided “when
one’s liberty is in jeopardy”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1968) (holding that a jury
trial is required for crimes punishable by two years in prison).
165
See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (describing the necessity that criminal
behavior be dangerous before it justifies preventive action).
166
Maybe for this reason, when scholars do express concern over crime prevention technologies,
their concerns are often vague. See Husak, supra note 2, at 215 (“The concept of punishment is vague
and allows for many borderline cases.”).
167
Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV.
113, 117 (1996).
168
See Corrado, supra note 117, at 808 (discussing the differences in restraints on liberty between
preventive detention and a restraining order); Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 93 (analyzing preventive
detention’s interference with an individual’s capacity to lead a free life).
169
In this way, perfect prevention appears analogous to the digital “worm” hypothesized by
Lawrence Lessig that would be deployed by the government to search private computers and could
identify only contraband, LESSIG, supra note 53, at 17–19, or other “binary search[es]” that reveal only
the presence of contraband, see Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 302 (2012) (defining the binary search
doctrine); Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the
World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 424 (2005) (explaining the history of the “binary
162
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prevention’s offense to autonomy less clear because people have no
legitimate autonomy interest in committing a crime, either as a matter of
legal doctrine170 or theory.171 For instance, when police stop a person on
the steps of a bank who is wearing a mask and carrying a gun and prevent
her from robbing the bank, we do not complain that they have improperly
intruded on her autonomy.172
Thus, to discuss perfect prevention’s impact on individual autonomy,
we must first pinpoint what, if any, legitimate autonomy interest is at stake.
Once that interest has been identified, we next must determine what limits
should be imposed on the perfect preventive state as a result. This section
addresses these issues in turn.
1. The Legitimate Interest in Deciding Whether to Break the Law
To answer the question of what legitimate autonomy interest might be
threatened by perfect prevention, it is helpful to consider again the
autonomy interests that are threatened by the preventive state. As noted,
prevention generally and preventive detention specifically are obviously
problematic because they intrude on an individual’s legitimate autonomy
interest in engaging in a broad range of lawful activities.173 The concern
with preventive detention, however, goes deeper than this. When the State
preemptively restricts the liberty of responsible individuals, it “fails to treat
search” in Supreme Court case law). Unfortunately, the primary concern of critics of the contraband
exception is inapplicable in the perfect prevention context. Both scholars and Supreme Court Justices
fear that allowing searches like Lessig’s “worm” will lead to an Orwellian world in which citizens must
assume that they are constantly under surveillance and any deviation from the law will be immediately
punished. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(presenting the dangers of these surveillance techniques); MacDonnell, supra, at 300–01 (describing
the “binary search” doctrine in which “individuals have no right to privacy in contraband, regardless of
the location”). As described, such punishment would then lead to substantial intrusion on legitimate
autonomy interests. But that concern simply brings us back to the distinction between punishment and
perfect prevention and the original question of whether perfect prevention intrudes on any legitimate
autonomy interest.
170
See Daniel R. Dinger, Should Parents Be Allowed to Record a Child’s Telephone
Conversations When They Believe the Child Is in Danger?: An Examination of the Federal Wiretap
Statute and the Doctrine of Vicarious Consent in the Context of a Criminal Prosecution, 28 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 955, 1024 n.367 (2005) (citing cases so holding); see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123
(majority opinion) (holding that a test that discloses only whether a particular substance is contraband
does not intrude on a legitimate privacy interest).
171
See Ferzan, supra note 3, at 178 (“We certainly do not claim that criminals ought to have
unfettered ability to commit crime and that any restrictions on that freedom interfere with their
autonomy.”).
172
How, precisely, the law should deal with this individual is nevertheless a matter of substantial
debate. See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 641–60 (arguing against using the criminal
law to punish incomplete attempts); Ferzan, supra note 3, at 178 (arguing that “[p]rotecting citizens’
security is a good reason for State interference”).
173
See Corrado, supra note 117, at 808 (discussing the limitations on the actor’s freedom with a
restraining order); Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 93 (suggesting that the criminal process is most
effective for those societies committed to individual liberty).
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the person as an autonomous moral agent who can be guided by reason.”174
This “bad bacteria” approach to personhood treats people merely as
“potentially beneficial or harmful objects.”175 Christopher Slobogin terms
this critique the “dehumanization objection” to prevention.176 Specifically,
prevention fails to acknowledge that the ability to choose whether to abide
by the law is unique and essential to one’s humanity.177 To put it another
way, prevention of a responsible agent is offensive because it deprives her
of the opportunity to decide whether to obey the law.178
Thus, the preventive state threatens two legitimate autonomy interests:
the interest in engaging in lawful conduct and the interest in choosing
whether to break the law. The first is obvious and uncontroversial, while
the second has generally evaded substantial discussion by scholars179 and
might strike some as troublesome on its face.180 Nevertheless, the
existence of the latter interest finds ample support in criminal and
constitutional law principles.
In criminal law, the requirement of a voluntary act is a recognition that
“a civilized society does not punish for thoughts alone.”181 That rule in
turn is a manifestation of the “inalienable right[],” to be free in one’s
174

Morse, supra note 15, at 1122.
Morse, supra note 3, at 57.
176
Slobogin, supra note 14, at 27.
177
See Cole, supra note 9, at 696 (“We generally presume that individuals have a choice to
conform their conduct to the law.”); Slobogin, supra note 14, at 27 (“The capacity to choose one’s
course is an essential aspect of our notion of what it means to be human.”).
178
See R.A. Duff, Dangerousness and Citizenship, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 141, 149 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998)
(arguing that preventive detention of the responsible is inconsistent with respect for individual
autonomy because it “does not leave citizens free to decide for themselves whether to obey the law”);
Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected
Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871, 881 (2011) (arguing that the State “must let those [dangerous]
individuals have the chance to exercise their free will to choose rightly or wrongly, as long as it is
sufficiently likely that they can be held accountable if they choose wrongly”).
179
See, e.g., Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How to Understand the
Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 838–40 (2011) (discussing the manner in which
“freedom of thought must include the freedom to choose to indulge any thoughts one wants to
indulge”).
180
For instance, then-Vice President Richard Nixon said, in the context of the civil rights
movement, “the deterioration [of respect for the rule of law] can be traced directly to the spread of the
corrosive doctrine that every citizen possesses an inherent right to decide for himself which laws to
obey and when to disobey them.” KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 31 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1, at 214 (1985); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 373 (6th ed. 2012) (“[P]eople are not punished for thoughts alone.”);
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 49 (1998) (“Everyone seems to agree that
it would be a perversion of the institution [of criminal justice] to punish in the absence of action—for
thoughts alone.”); Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87
MINN. L. REV. 269, 282 (2002) (“The maxim that civilized societies should not punish individuals for
their ‘thoughts alone’ has existed for three centuries.”).
175
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thoughts, which is embodied in the First Amendment.
As Justice
Cardozo recognized, the “freedom of thought, and speech . . . is the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”183
Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected the government’s use of a
defendant’s “abstract beliefs” to enhance his sentence184 and has
overturned a criminal conviction for private possession of obscene
materials on the ground that “control[ling] the moral content of a person’s
thoughts . . . is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First
Amendment.”185 Similarly, constitutional rights to free speech, privacy,
and substantive due process can be seen to protect “deliberative
autonomy,” or an individual’s ability to formulate opinions and make
decisions based on a maximum amount of information.186 Thus, speech
that does not appeal to or support rational decision making—such as
fighting words, incitement, and libel—is entitled to less constitutional
protection.187
The importance of civil disobedience—lawbreaking as political
protest—as an engine of social change in America also supports the
existence of a legitimate autonomy interest in deciding to break the law.188
Protests that deliberately violate laws that are thought to conflict with
deeper moral imperatives serve a useful social purpose by drawing needed
attention to problems that have escaped social recognition.189 Such
protests have been the catalyst for the expansion of civil rights and other
reforms in the United States.190 But of course such protests cannot occur
unless the protestor can exercise her autonomy and choose to break the
182
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (stating that the First Amendment includes a penumbra of inalienable rights).
183
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937); see also Charles Fried, The New First
Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (“I cede authority
to the state to draw the necessary concrete boundaries between our respective spheres of action. But no
such necessity requires, indeed self-respect forbids, that I cede to the state the authority to limit my use
of my rational powers.”).
184
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992).
185
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565–66 (1969).
186
See Aditi Bagchi, Deliberative Autonomy and Legitimate State Purpose Under the First
Amendment, 68 ALB. L. REV. 815, 815–17 (2005) (discussing the right to free speech in the context of
deliberative autonomy); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2
(1995) (propounding a constitutional theory on the ground of securing deliberative autonomy).
187
See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 177–86 (1997) (outlining
the different types of protected speech and the level of protection afforded to each).
188
See Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil Disobedience and the
Rule of Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083, 2085–92 (2007) (articulating a philosophy of civil
disobedience, including the conscientious violation of the law and acceptance of punishment).
189
Id. at 2095.
190
Id. at 2094; see Rich, supra note 46, at 826–27 (describing the burning of draft cards and sitins as criminal conduct that “benefit[ted] society”).
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law.
Though it seems clear that there is some legitimate autonomy interest
in deciding whether to break the law rooted in freedom of thought, it is
somewhat harder to define its contours.192 To that end, I make three claims
about the scope of the interest. First, the interest in deciding whether to
break the law encompasses anything that occurs within an individual’s
mind193 and does not involve a voluntary physical manifestation of the
individual’s thoughts.194 Thus, one has a legitimate autonomy interest in
fantasies, thoughts, desires, plans, and intentions that involve illegal
activity.195 As soon as one voluntarily engages in some conduct to make
191
Cf. William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 243, 248 (1994)
(“When the laws of the state conflict with religious duties, the believer must choose between obeying
her government’s laws or following her religious obligations.”). Note that the necessity of an
autonomy interest in deciding whether to break the law is a separate question from the much thornier
issue of whether law-breaking in the name of civil disobedience should be punished. See, e.g., Eduardo
Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1158–60 (2007)
(recognizing that the failure of the State to punish those who engage in civil disobedience would
undermine the expressive value of their conduct).
192
See Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Freedom of Thought—Seventh Circuit Upholds City’s
Order Banning Former Sex Offender from Public Parks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1054, 1054 (2005) (“[I]t
seems clear that there is a constitutional right to freedom of thought, but the scope and contours of this
right are poorly developed.”). The failure of scholars to articulate the right to freedom of thought more
clearly makes sense in light of traditional technological limitations on the State’s ability to intrude on
an individual’s thoughts. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive
Enhancement and the Constitution, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (recognizing that there has been “no
reason for the law to protect our private, unexpressed thoughts because such internal thoughts were, in
any case, beyond the reach of the state”). Moreover, such a discussion has been unnecessary in the
context of the preventive state, because most tools of prevention intrude so broadly on individual
autonomy that any limitation on an individual’s thoughts could be lumped together with the more
obvious limitations on her freedom to engage in lawful activities. Nevertheless, at least one scholar has
attempted to articulate the scope of, and boundaries on, the freedom of thought. Id.; see also Marc
Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1141, 1150–52 (2008) (articulating a theory of freedom of thought in the context of virtual reality
experiences).
193
On this point, I disagree with Alec Walen, who argues that “the law can criminalize choosing
to form an intention to pursue a criminal plan of action without criminalizing mere thought.” Walen,
supra note 179, at 839 (emphasis omitted). Walen’s argument depends on a distinction he draws
between conceiving or evaluating an idea, which he calls “mere thought,” and choosing to engage in
action, which he considers something more. Id. at 838 (emphasis omitted). Though I agree that
choosing to do something is different than conceiving or evaluating an idea, I do not see how the
former takes what occurs merely in one’s mind out of the realm of “mere thought” and thus outside of
the protection of the freedom of thought.
194
Thus, the involuntary physical manifestations that may accompany criminal thoughts, such as
increased heart rate or changes in skin temperature, are also protected by the autonomy interest in
deciding whether to break the law.
195
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook
to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.” (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Steven J. Heyman,
Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
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those thoughts real, however, she is no longer within the scope of her
legitimate autonomy interest in deciding whether to break the law.196
Second, conditioning one’s liberty to engage in otherwise legal conduct on
whether she wishes to later break the law intrudes on that person’s
legitimate autonomy interest in deciding whether to break the law. This
claim is a corollary to the more general proposition that the State infringes
on a freedom when it denies a benefit or forbids conduct otherwise
permitted to all on the basis of an individual’s exercise of that freedom.197
Third, because the autonomy interest in deciding whether to break the law
involves deliberative autonomy, the meaningful exercise of that autonomy
requires that an individual have access to as much legitimately relevant
information as possible.198
The next section explores the implications of these claims. One issue
still remains, however. Though there is a legitimate autonomy interest in
deciding whether to break the law, which stems from the freedom of
thought protected under the First Amendment, this does not mean that the
State can never intrude on that interest. Even the most fundamental
constitutional rights can be restricted when the State’s interest in doing so
is great enough.199 The question remains, then, of when state interests
might overcome an individual’s legitimate autonomy interest in deciding
10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 657 (2002) (“[A] central tenet of liberalism is that a boundary must
be drawn between the outward realm of the state and the inward life of the individual.”).
196
The distinction that I draw here between those things that occur internal to one’s mind and the
voluntary physical manifestations of those internal mental processes does not mean that thoughts
cannot constitute acts or even culpable acts. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 200–10
(discussing whether intentions are acts or culpable acts). Rather, I contend that even if mental
processes can be culpable acts, they are covered by the freedom of thought and the legitimate autonomy
interest in deciding whether to break the law.
197
See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (“[O]ur modern
‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine holds that the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech’ even if he has no entitlement
to that benefit.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972))); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1961) (holding that a religious test for public
office violated the “freedom of belief and religion,” even though “a person is not compelled to hold
public office”).
198
See, e.g., Benjamin Moulton & Jamie S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making:
The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 87 (2010) (noting that the American
Medical Association requires that physicians disclose all relevant medical information to their
patients); Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 463, 492
(“When our exclusionary rules operate to conceal relevant, readily available information from a jury—
which is precisely what those rules typically are designed to do—we infringe on jurors’ deliberative
autonomy . . . .”); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of the Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 340–41 (1987) (discussing autonomy in the context of
information disclosure in the attorney-client relationship). See generally Clarence H. Braddock et al.,
Informed Decision Making in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
2313 (1999) (considering patient autonomy in the context of informed medical decision making).
199
Cf. Wells, supra note 187, at 179–86 (discussing categories of speech which are accorded
lesser protection under the First Amendment).
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whether to break the law. At this point, however, it is not necessary to
answer this question. Instead, it is enough for now to recognize that one’s
freedom to think as one wishes, even if those thoughts are detestable,
antisocial, and potentially harmful,200 is a normative guidepost in
suggesting that the State generally should allow an individual to decide
whether to break the law absent some strong countervailing interest.
2. Protecting the Interest in Deciding Whether to Break the Law
The three prior claims about the scope of the interest in deciding
whether to break the law suggest three limitations on the perfect preventive
state. First, the State should not attempt to make criminal conduct
impossible by directly interfering with an individual’s capacity to decide
whether to break the law. Second, the State should not selectively prevent
people from engaging in otherwise lawful conduct because of their intent
to break the law. Third, the State should be at least somewhat transparent
when it implements perfect preventive measures in order to permit citizens
to maximize their deliberative autonomy if they decide whether to break
the law. These limitations are discussed below.
a. Preventing the Desire to Engage in Criminal Conduct
The most obvious way for the State to prevent criminal conduct would
be to make it impossible for people to want to engage in the conduct. This
could be done directly. For instance, the State could inject a hypothetical
pharmaceutical in the water supply to suppress its citizens’ anti-social or
violent impulses,201 or distribute a pharmaceutical that replaces the high
from an illegal narcotic with unpleasant physical reactions to prevent
people from deciding to use the drug.202 Less directly, the State could use
involuntary aversion therapy to prevent criminal desires.203 Because such
200
See Walen, supra note 179, at 838–39 (detailing how the intent to commit a criminal act makes
the commission of that act more likely).
201
Though no such drug currently exists, its development is possible. See Erica Beecher-Monas
& Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for
Violence?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 321 n.125 (2006) (recognizing the potential for drug
therapy to suppress abnormal responses and desires in violent offenders).
202
See Ryan Calo, Future of the Internet Symposium: (Im)Perfect Enforcement, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.concurringopinions.com (discussing such an effort in the context
of prohibition). Though such efforts are the stuff of science fiction, see, e.g., ANTHONY BURGESS, A
CLOCKWORK ORANGE 100–05 (1962) (telling the story of the narrator who, after committing violent
crimes, becomes a test subject for a technique in which violent acts become associated with the effects
of a nausea-inducing drug through a type of aversion therapy), and conspiracy theories, see, e.g.,
CHARLES ELIOT PERKINS, THE TRUTH ABOUT WATER FLUORIDATION 11 (1952) (“[Water fluoridation]
is a planned experiment in mass medication which is part of the technique of the Communist
philosophy to implant itself in America through mass control of the people by the State.”), their
scientific plausibility demands some discussion.
203
“Aversion therapy” is a form of behavioral therapy that aims to make a patient give up an
undesirable habit by associating it with an unpleasant stimulus. See Aversion Therapy, M-W.COM,
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tactics would either interfere directly with an individual’s ability to choose
whether to break the law or place a physical price on doing so, they should
not be permitted.204
One might argue, however, that involuntary aversion therapy is simply
a more aggressive version of efforts by the State to establish community
norms against certain criminal conduct.205 For example, the State
inculcates law-abiding norms in its citizens by punishing those who break
the law,206 and governments invest substantial resources in publicity
campaigns to discourage crimes like drunk driving and child abuse.207 But
punishment and public information campaigns treat people as responsible
agents who are capable of being rationally persuaded to give up their
harmful conduct.208 Involuntary aversion therapy, on the other hand, does
not appeal to rational decision-making and instead activates a subconscious
aversion to the decision to engage in harmful conduct.209 Thus, neither
aversion therapy nor more direct modes of limiting people’s thoughts
should be permissible tools of the perfect preventive state.
b. Selective Screen Based on Mental State
The perfect preventive state also could screen individuals who seek to
engage in otherwise lawful conduct and prevent those who harbor an
undesirable mental state from doing so. Though not currently available,
the technology to make the necessary sorts of determinations about the

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aversion%20therapy (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (defining
“aversion therapy” as “therapy intended to suppress an undesirable habit or behavior . . . by associating
the habit or behavior with a noxious or punishing stimulus”).
204
See Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 877–78 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that administration of
“fright drug” in prison “raise[s] serious constitutional questions respecting . . . impermissible tinkering
with the mental processes”). The involuntary administration of pharmaceuticals also intrudes on
fundamental interests that are not the subject of the instant discussion, such as the right to bodily
integrity. See Rich, supra note 46, at 818–19 (discussing the wide range of possibly invasive
prevention techniques).
205
See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998)
(describing the role of social norms in regulating behavior).
206
See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597–600
(1996) (describing the expressive theory of punishment as one based on moral condemnation).
207
See, e.g., Admin. for Children & Families, National Child Abuse Prevention Month, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.childwelfare.gov/preventing/preventionmonth/ (last
visited Jan. 25, 2014) (providing resources to help abused children and to raise awareness of children’s
issues); R. Gil Kerlikowske, National Impaired Driving Prevention Month, OFF. NAT’L DRUG
CONTROL POL’Y (Dec. 1, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/12/01/nationalimpaired-driving-prevention-month (discussing government efforts to reduce impaired driving).
208
See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Oil and Water: Why Retribution and Repentance Do Not Mix, 22
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59, 65 (2003) (discussing the treatment of sexual predators in terms of taking
responsibility for their actions).
209
See id. at 78 (noting that the “experience of aversion therapy bypasses the conscious,
intellectual, and autonomous being”).
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contents of an individual’s mind might someday exist. Such technology
would allow the State to narrowly target conduct already defined as
unlawful. For instance, the possession of pseudoephedrine—a common
ingredient in cold medications—is legal, but many jurisdictions outlaw
possessing it with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.211 The
perfect preventive state could screen those who seek to purchase over-thecounter medication containing pseudoephedrine and prevent those who
intend to use it to produce methamphetamine from buying the medicine.
In addition to enabling perfect prevention of previously-defined
criminal conduct, technology that could effectively ascertain an
individual’s mental state or intentions would allow for the loosening of
some legal restrictions and the more careful tailoring of others. For
instance, the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994212 criminalizes the possession
of firearms in school zones on the stated ground that their possession gives
rise to violence and threatens the quality of education.213 Were it possible
to distinguish with sufficient certainty those who intend to commit
violence from those who do not, the current ban on gun possession in
school zones could be amended to permit those who do not harbor a
violent intent to maintain possession of their weapons.214 This sort of
tailoring would allow those who do not harbor criminal plans to enjoy a
more robust Second Amendment freedom, while continuing to prevent the
dangerous criminal conduct that led to the passage of the Act in the first
place.
Such screening is problematic, however, because it conditions an
individual’s ability to engage in otherwise legal conduct on the contents of
210
Much has been written about the potential of neuroimaging to provide insight into the mental
state of a party to a dispute. See, e.g., Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly:
Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1119, 1125 (2010) (arguing that in view of the current state of neuroimaging science, such evidence
should not be admitted in criminal trials); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a
Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 237–38 (2012) (offering an optimistic view of the utility of
neuroimaging as evidence in tort cases). Though there are many obstacles to the accuracy of
neuroimaging, the proposed use to identify an individual’s current, rather than past, mental state would
eliminate at least some of those roadblocks. See Brown & Murphy, supra, at 1187–88 (arguing that
neuroimaging evidence is of limited probative value to prove past mental states because all it can do is
measure a brain’s present reactions to stimuli). Regardless, my goal is not to attempt to predict how
technologies of the future might work, but to point out their potential for intruding on legitimate
individual interests.
211
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.440 (2007) (criminalizing ephedrine possession with
intent to manufacture methamphetamine, but allowing possession for other lawful purposes).
212
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2012).
213
Id. § 922(q)(1)(F), (q)(2)(A).
214
There may be other reasons for forbidding the possession of guns on school grounds, such as
fear of accidents, which might provide support for maintaining the ban in some form. The fact
remains, however, that intent-discerning technology would permit finer tailoring of criminal
prohibitions.
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her mind. In the pseudoephedrine example, anyone could buy cold
medicine containing pseudoephedrine except for those who have decided
to use it for a criminal purpose. Or if we forbid only those who possess a
firearm with an intent to cause injury from entering schools, one’s ability
to engage in the hypothetically lawful conduct of entering a school with a
firearm would be contingent on whether she intends to break the law once
inside. In this way, conditioning one’s freedom to engage in otherwise
lawful conduct on thinking lawful thoughts—or not thinking unlawful
ones—intrudes on an individual’s legitimate autonomy interest in deciding
whether to break the law.215
The State has two options to avoid this intrusion on an individual’s
freedom of thought. First, it can prevent all instances of the conduct
regardless of the content of the actor’s mind. This is the current approach
to gun possession in school zones: it is forbidden by law and, if technology
permitted, it could be made practically impossible. Second, the State can
allow all instances of the otherwise lawful conduct and punish those who
engage in that conduct with the improper mental state. The State takes this
approach with respect to the possession of pseudoephedrine and many
other acts in preparation of crimes.216
Yet there is something seemingly incongruous in saying that the State
may punish otherwise lawful conduct engaged in with an improper mental
state but cannot preemptively prevent the same combination of conduct
and mental state. To put it more concretely, if the State can punish
someone who possesses pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine, why should the State not be allowed to prevent that
person from obtaining the pseudoephedrine in the first place if it can
determine in advance that she has the same intent? This inconsistency
does not arise merely with respect to the limited class of crimes defined as
the commission of an otherwise lawful act with some nefarious intent. For
example, the criminal law punishes incomplete attempts—such as when an
actor intends to commit a crime and takes a substantial step beyond mere
preparation in furtherance of that intent, but is prevented from bringing her
criminal plan to fruition.217 These steps need not be, and often are not,

215
See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the Constitution protects
individual rights even when a citizen does not wish to act on those rights).
216
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (forbidding the transportation of another person in interstate or
foreign commerce “with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense”).
217
DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 374–75. The criminalization of incomplete attempts is arguably
part of the preventive state in that it allows law enforcement to intervene to prevent more serious
harms. See Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
387 (“[S]ufficiently threatening behavior may allow law enforcement to intervene early . . . , [or]
provide . . . justification for preventative civil commitment.”).
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218

criminal standing alone.
But if the State could technologically identify
individuals who possess a criminal intent, why should it not be allowed to
prevent those individuals from taking substantial, non-criminal steps in
furtherance of that intent?
One could resolve this conundrum by concluding that incomplete
attempts and otherwise-lawful acts with specific criminal intents should
not be criminalized, either because the punished acts are not culpable or
because punishing them impermissibly punishes thoughts.219 In either
case, the inconsistency disappears because both the punitive and perfect
preventive states are now subject to the same limitation: the State can
neither punish nor make practically impossible otherwise lawful conduct
based on the contents of the actor’s mind. However normatively or
analytically tempting this resolution may be, it is descriptively inaccurate,
because jurisdictions do punish incomplete attempts.
The inconsistency also can be resolved by recognizing that punishment
is different from perfect prevention in a way that justifies the former’s use
even where the latter is inappropriate. Before an actor can be punished for
an incomplete attempt, a factfinder must find that she had a criminal intent
and completed a sufficiently culpable act in furtherance of that intent.220
The former question is a normative one, at least in part, as the factfinder
must decide if the actor’s intent was sufficiently firm and not too
contingent on future events to give rise to criminal culpability.221 The
218
A classic incomplete attempt hypothetical involves a person lying in wait to kill another and
then changing her mind or being arrested. See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 642 (“[W]hen
Frankie lies in wait for Johnny to return . . . , at which time she intends to kill him [she has] committed
an incomplete attempt at murder.”). Lying in wait, of course, is not a criminal act, as the popularity of
surprise birthday parties establishes. Though precisely the point at which an individual can be found
guilty of attempt for coming close to realizing her intent to commit a future crime varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and in some cases from crime to crime; most jurisdictions employ the
Model Penal Code’s broad definition of the actus reus of attempt as “a substantial step in a course of
conduct planned to culminate in . . . commission of the crime.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1985);
see John Hasnas, Attempt, Preparation, and Harm: The Case of the Jealous Ex-Husband, 9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 761, 762 (2012) (“[G]oing to a potential victim’s home with a loaded firearm and lurking in
the bushes outside a window . . . is clearly a substantial step toward the crime of attempted murder.”).
219
See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 643 (arguing that incomplete attempts are not
culpable acts); Morse, supra note 217, at 389 (finding it “plausible” that “punishment for incomplete
attempts is punishment for thoughts rather than for culpable actions”).
220
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (describing conduct that may constitute a substantial
step).
221
See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 203–06 (discussing the conditional nature of
intents in the context of attempt liability); D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for
Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281,
1294–95 (2004) (arguing that even the most “ordinary” inquiries into a defendant’s mental state
“depend so much on minor variations in detail,” and they thus require the jury to operate “in a
contextually rich environment”); see also Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1999)
(holding that some, but not all, conditional intents would be sufficient for guilt under a federal
carjacking statute).
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latter inquiry also can be broken into two pieces: a factual assessment of
the individual’s action and a normative judgment about whether those acts
are sufficiently wrongful to deserve criminal punishment. For instance, the
factfinder must evaluate the seriousness of the intended crime, how close
the actor was to its completion, how certain the crime was to occur, and
how much the actor already has done in order to decide whether her
(possibly) non-criminal conduct subjects her to liability for a criminal
attempt.222 These normative judgments by the factfinder are uniquely
necessary in the context of criminal attempts because, unlike in the typical
case where the legislature has defined the harmful, forbidden conduct with
some specificity, the act required for an attempt is intentionally vague.223
Thus, when faced with two actors who are charged with the same attempt
offense based on the same specific otherwise lawful act, two juries may
rightly find one guilty and another not guilty because of the small
variations in the surrounding circumstances.224 While the punitive state
permits, and indeed requires, this individualized normative inquiry, perfect
prevention does not. Without that fact-specific judgment, the State
therefore intrudes on an individual’s legitimate autonomy interest in
deciding whether to break the law when it conditions the individual’s
freedom to engage in otherwise lawful conduct on the contents of her
mind.
Two further observations are in order. First, this limitation on the use
of screening in perfect prevention applies only to incomplete attempts and
to the relatively narrow subset of crimes that forbid the combination of
otherwise lawful conduct and the intent to engage in future criminal
conduct. Instead, most crimes that involve some future intent requirement
use that future intent to distinguish a more serious crime from a less
serious one.225 In these cases, if it were possible to make the underlying
criminal conduct practically impossible, the State would presumably do so
regardless of whether those engaging in that conduct have the aggravating
intent to engage in some future criminal act. And even if the State were to
condition an individual’s ability to engage in the underlying criminal
conduct on the absence of the aggravating future intent, this would not
222
Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and Attempt
Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 490–92 (2004).
223
See Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of Criminal Law, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 879, 909 (2007) (noting the various formulations of the act required for attempt liability
to attach).
224
See Risinger, supra note 221, at 1295 & n.66 (discussing how small variations in a case can
change a jury’s understanding of a factual circumstance).
225
For instance, criminal codes frequently punish the possession of an illegal drug with the intent
to sell to a greater extent than mere possession. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(b)(1), (d)(1) (2011)
(providing different punishments for the possession of controlled substances and possession with the
intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture).
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intrude on any legitimate liberty interest of the individual.
Second, the limitation described in this Section is not necessarily
absolute. The State can intrude on fundamental individual liberties when
its interests are sufficiently compelling and the intrusion is narrowly
tailored to serve those interests.226 So too might the State be justified in
screening people under certain circumstances and selectively restricting
their liberty to engage in otherwise lawful conduct based on their mental
state. Fleshing out when such circumstances might exist is beyond the
scope of this Article, but certain factors would likely be relevant: the
severity of the harm threatened; the frequency with which the targeted
conduct leads to the threatened harm; and whether the targeted conduct is
subject independently to constitutional protection.227
c. Transparency
In order to meaningfully exercise her autonomy interest in deciding
whether to break the law, an individual must have access to as much
information as possible that is legitimately relevant to that decision.228 The
constitutional fair warning doctrine provides useful guidance in
ascertaining what information is legitimately relevant to this decision. It
teaches that the law must inform potential criminals as clearly as possible
both what the law forbids and the potential punishment for breaking the
law.229 This doctrine is primarily justified on the ground that punishment
without notice is unfair and unjust.230 Fair warning also ensures that
potential criminals have enough information to craft their conduct in a way
that avoids the law’s prohibitions, if they wish.231 The hope, of course, is
that the potential criminal will choose not to violate the law, but fair
warning also provides the criminal who is committed to breaking the law
with an opportunity to make an informed decision to do so.
226
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (applying the “strict
scrutiny” standard for laws that burden protected speech).
227
See Ferzan, supra note 3, at 155–57 (discussing the factors that might be considered in
assessing the risk factors of an individual under a selective prevention scheme).
228
See supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing autonomy in informed decision making
in various contests).
229
See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“[N]o man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”); Jordan v. De
George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) (“The essential purpose of the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine is to
warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct.”); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S.
25, 27 (1931) (“[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”).
230
See Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal
Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 461–62 (2001) (examining the fair warning principle and
describing ex post facto laws as being unjust).
231
See id. at 463 (“[T]he Ex Post Facto Clause imposes a requirement of notice consistent with
the principle of legality: It requires that a legislature give advance notice of its intent to treat conduct as
criminal so that individuals may ensure that their actions conform to the law.”).
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Similarly, when the State prevents people from engaging in certain
conduct on the grounds that it is criminal, citizens are entitled to know
what conduct the State aims to prevent. With this information, they can
meaningfully decide whether to abandon their desired criminal ends, to
seek to achieve them in a way that is not frustrated by perfect prevention,
or to overcome the State’s efforts at prevention. Imagine, for instance, that
State A wants to prevent people from engaging in the criminal conduct of
viewing child pornography online and thus mandates that ISPs block
access to websites known to host child pornography in order to prevent its
citizens from engaging in the crime of possessing child pornography.232 In
implementing its mandate, State A can choose to be transparent—requiring
an ISP to inform the user that a site was blocked because it contains child
pornography, that viewing such material is a crime, and that the State
ordered the ISP to block the site233—or it can choose to be obscure—
requiring that the ISP display an innocuous error message that conceals all
of this information.234 In light of the harm and moral outrage caused by the
production and viewing of child pornography, most citizens of State A
might be perfectly happy that the State prevents people from viewing child
pornography on the Internet, transparently or not.235
The choice between transparency and obscurity matters, however.
Imagine that Sam, a resident of State A, wants to view child pornography.
If State A chooses to prevent him from doing so obscurely, Sam may not
know that he is being prevented from doing something, what he is being
prevented from doing, why he is prevented from doing it, or who is
responsible for the obstacles to his Internet access. Without any of this
232
The United Kingdom, Canada, and Finland take a version of this approach to preventing the
viewing of child pornography. See Federica Casarosa, Protection of Minors Online: Available
Regulatory Approaches, 14 J. INTERNET L. 25, 31 (2011) (describing the Internet Watch Foundation’s
system for reporting sites with illegal content to ISPs to facilitate blocking or disabling access);
Nunziato, supra note 99, at 1136–38 (describing the Cleanfeed system adopted in the United Kingdom
to block blacklisted websites, as well as similar models in Canada and Finland).
233
For example, in the United Kingdom, the Internet Watch Foundation suggests that it is “good
practice” for ISPs to post the following statement when they block a page that is believed to contained
child pornography: “Access has been denied by your internet access provider because this page may
contain indecent images of children as identified by the Internet Watch Foundation. If you think this
page has been blocked in error please contact <your service provider>.” Blocking Good Practice,
INTERNET WATCH FOUND., http://www.iwf.org.uk/members/member-policies/url-list/blocking-goodpractice (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
234
The Chinese government takes this approach when it prevents access to undesirable foreign
websites. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 94 (2006).
235
Of course, there are other issues that would likely arise in the context of such a government
mandate. Most notably, the censorship model almost certainly would intrude on the First Amendment
interests of both the publisher of the targeted websites and those seeking to view them. See Broder
Kleinschmidt, An International Comparison of ISP’s Liabilities for Unlawful Third Party Content, 18
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 332, 341–42 (2010) (discussing challenges to similar regimes in the United
States).
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information, he may become frustrated and give up, satisfy his interest
elsewhere, or bypass the perfect preventive scheme by happenstance. But
regardless of what happens, State A has failed to respect his autonomy and,
given Sam’s ignorance, it is not accurate to say that he has made a fully
autonomous choice to break the law or to obey it.236 Indeed, even if he
discovers some of the information that the State has hidden, Sam’s
autonomy will remain effectively ignorant. Maybe he will realize that he
is being prevented from accessing some portion of the Internet, but
nonetheless conclude that his particular ISP is seeking to prevent access to
all obscene material, lawful or not. Or maybe he will perceive the State’s
hand, but not recognize that the State is trying to keep him from
committing a crime. Thus, even if it reveals some of this information, the
State will undermine Sam’s autonomy.237
But if the State transparently reveals to Sam that it is responsible for
the limitations on his web browsing and that those limitations exist because
the targeted websites contain child pornography, then Sam would be able
to exercise his autonomy fully in deciding how he will proceed.
Specifically, Sam could accept the blocking as justified and forego his
interest, or seek to circumvent or overcome the perfect preventive
technology in some way. We would hope Sam would choose the first
option, of course, and if he does then we can say that the choice was truly
his own. Likewise, if Sam chooses the second option and ultimately
violates the law, the State can punish him, knowing again that the choice
was his and that he is fully deserving of punishment.
This transparency and respect for Sam’s autonomy may come at some
cost. If the State obscures its involvement in preventing criminal conduct
and its goals in doing so, the determined criminal must spend some
resources ascertaining those facts before she can begin to circumvent the
State’s efforts. But when the State is transparent, the determined criminal
can seek to achieve his goal more efficiently. Moreover, reactance theory
teaches that perceived restrictions on an activity increase the desirability of
engaging in that activity.238 Thus Sam, knowing that the State has limited
his access to child pornography, may seek more actively to view it.
Intentional law-breaking is always a risk of permitting individual
236
Cf. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 9–10 (2012) (recognizing that the “knowing” requirement for a valid waiver of trial rights is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s focus on individual autonomy in plea bargaining).
237
Of course, it is possible that a particularly enterprising individual will be able to figure out all
these legitimately relevant facts even if the State seeks to obscure them. Even then, the most that can
be said is that the individual will get to decide autonomously whether to break the law. It would still be
inaccurate, however, to say that the State has respected that individual’s autonomy.
238
See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 693 (2000) (“[W]hen free behaviors are threatened, the attractiveness
of the threatened behavior increases.”).
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autonomy, however, and the State can punish Sam if he is successful, with
confidence that he is a culpable and dangerous criminal.
Though facts like the State’s role in perfect prevention and the nature
of the conduct the State seeks to prevent are legitimately relevant to an
individual’s decision of whether to break the law, the mechanics of how
the State aims to make criminal conduct practically impossible are not. In
the realm of traditional crime fighting, the State is not required to publicize
its specific strategies and tactics. Police can actively conceal their attempts
to ferret out crime by going undercover239 and are permitted to lie to
suspects in an effort to obtain incriminating information.240 The techniques
and procedures of law enforcement investigations are also exempt from
Freedom of Information Act requests.241 This secrecy is justifiable on a
number of grounds, including officer safety and a desire not to undermine
law enforcement effectiveness.242 Such secrecy also makes sense here
because revealing law enforcement techniques to potential criminals does
not advance any legitimate autonomy interest. Certainly, knowledge about
specific police strategies would be relevant to a potential criminal’s
decision about whether to break the law because the knowledge would
allow her to accurately assess, and possibly seek to diminish, her risk of
apprehension. But just as the potential criminal does not have a legitimate
interest in breaking the law, she has no legitimate interest in minimizing
the likelihood of apprehension and punishment if she does. Similarly, the
potential criminal does not have a legitimate interest in accurately
assessing the risk of apprehension and punishment; rather, the State has a
valid interest in maximizing deterrence by inflating the perception of that
risk.
In the perfect prevention context, this means that information detailing
the specifics of how a perfect preventive technology works is not
legitimately relevant to an individual’s decision of whether to conform to
the law. Recall Sam once more. If he knows that State A is preventing
him from accessing websites that contain child pornography, he can decide
to forego his desire to engage in criminal conduct or seek to circumvent or
overcome the perfect preventive technology in violation of the law. Sam
has a legitimate interest in making this decision as a responsible citizen of
State A, but if he tries to break the law, he has no legitimate interest in
succeeding. Information about how State A is preventing him from
239
See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1300 n.318 (2012)
(collecting cases where federal courts have approved of recording conversations between suspects and
undercover agents and informants).
240
See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737–39 (1969) (upholding the admission of a confession
that was made during an interrogation in which police lied about strength of their case).
241
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012).
242
Id.
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accessing websites containing child pornography is relevant to Sam’s
decision about whether to break the law only in that it might allow him to
circumvent the perfect preventive technology more efficiently or
effectively. Thus, extending the transparency of perfect prevention to the
mechanics of the perfect preventive technology does not advance
legitimate autonomy interests.
B. The Problem of Equality
One virtue of structural approaches to the regulation of private conduct
is that they apply equally to all affected people.243 In that vein, by
targeting criminal conduct rather than specific people, perfect prevention
does not allow the State to discriminate on improper bases such as race,
religion, or political animosity.244 Perfect prevention in turn might restore
some of the trust that marginalized communities have lost in the State and
address broader societal concerns about inequality in the criminal justice
system.245
The equality of perfect prevention also has a downside, however, in
that it treats every person like a potential criminal.246 Specifically, by
preventing all people equally from engaging in the targeted criminal
conduct, the perfect preventive state effectively assumes that everyone has
the same baseline capacity, inclination, and tendency to engage in that
conduct sufficient to justify an intrusion on their liberty. This assumption
is problematic for at least three reasons. First, it is almost certainly not
true. From a purely statistical standpoint, crimes are often committed more
frequently by certain classes of people and less frequently by others. For
instance, young males commit far more violent crime than older females.247
Meanwhile, middle-aged white males with less education are more likely

243
See Cheng, supra note 50, at 665 (noting that structure “tends to produce higher compliance
rates, because its regulatory power is immediate and uniformly imposed on most members of the
population without the need for further police intervention”).
244
See Rich, supra note 46, at 807 (noting the possibility that prosecutorial “choices can be
infected by improper considerations that give rise to constitutional concerns”).
245
Id.
246
See Keith Hayward, Situational Crime Prevention and its Discontents: Rational Choice
Theory Versus the “Culture of Now,” 41 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 232, 243 (2007) (“Today, in contrast,
contemporary [situational crime prevention] theorists proceed from the standpoint that ‘we are all
criminals now’—almost as if criminality was a shared or universal social norm.”).
247
Compare Crime in the United States 2011: Table 39, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-39 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014)
(placing the number of 2011 violent crime arrests among males who were age eighteen and under at
42,822), with Crime in the United States 2011: Table 40, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-40 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014)
(placing the number of 2011 violent crime arrests among females who were age eighteen and under at
9542).
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to commit multiple drunk-driving offenses.
Moreover, if some people
are predisposed to flout the law, others are presumably predisposed to
abide by it scrupulously.
Second, treating everyone like a potential criminal communicates to
each person specifically and to the citizenry generally that their
government does not trust them.249 Such a lack of trust is insulting because
it suggests that the government does not respect the moral fiber of its
citizens and their ability to forego criminal conduct.250 With respect to
certain minor offenses that are committed by broad swathes of the
population, like jaywalking or speeding, this lack of trust may in fact be
justified. But the expression of distrust of its citizens by the government
has the potential of undermining the legitimacy of our representational
system.251
Third, the equality of perfect prevention runs contrary to the liberal
presumption that a citizen is law-abiding absent individualized evidence to
the contrary.252 Thus, the State must provide individualized proof of guilt
to punish253 and the nature and duration of punishment are determined
based somewhat on the individual circumstances of the crime and the
criminal.254 Similarly, the State may use the tools of the preventive state
only after putting forth individualized proof of dangerousness and
Individualized treatment in the allocation of
irresponsibility.255
punishment and the imposition of prevention respects the humanity and
248
Matthew DeMichele & Nathan C. Lowe, DWI Recidivism: Risk Implications for Community
Supervision, 75 FED. PROBATION 19, 21 (2011).
249
See R.A. Duff & S.E. Marshall, Benefits, Burdens and Responsibilities: Some Ethical
Dimensions of Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL
CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 155, at 17, 21–22 (“[Situational Crime Prevention] measures typically
manifest a lack or loss of trust: they are (seen as) necessary because we do not trust people not to
commit the crimes that they aim to prevent.”).
250
Id. at 22.
251
See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777–81 (1994) (discussing the role of reciprocal
trust in the legitimacy of a republican government).
252
See Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost Status as a
Foundation for a Lost Immunity, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1229, 1230–31 (2011) (noting that “[a] state
must normally accord its autonomous and accountable citizens” the presumption that they are lawabiding “as a matter of basic respect for their autonomous moral agency”).
253
See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 524
(2012) (“[T]here is no substitute for an individual determination of guilt before a deprivation of
liberty.”).
254
See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (per curiam) (recognizing that judges
can depart from federal sentencing guideline range “based on an individualized determination that they
yield an excessive sentence in a particular case”).
255
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357–58 (1997) (holding that a Kansas civil
commitment statute was “consistent with the requirements of . . . other statutes that [the Court has]
upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to
control their dangerousness”).
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dignity of the person subject to the State’s power. Perfect prevention, on
the other hand, does not require, and indeed does not allow for, such
individualized findings, and it operates from the unsubstantiated
assumption that all citizens are equally predisposed to break the law.
By treating everyone like a potential criminal, perfect prevention
upsets the relationship between the State and its citizens and threatens our
deliberative democracy. Just like the parent who makes a tempting but
dangerous toy disappear during a child’s naptime, the State removes the
option of engaging in a dangerous or undesirable activity.257
Surreptitiously removing dangerous temptation makes sense in the parental
context: it ensures that the parent can fulfill her duty to protect her child,
avoids the complications of dealing with the child’s anger over losing the
toy, and abrogates any need to explain the decision. But with the
exception of those unable to care for themselves, the State does not act as a
parent to its citizens.258 Thus, while a parent may relish the opportunity to
avoid a child’s tantrums, the State does not have that luxury.
Rather, for the State’s authority of its people to be legitimate, public
Deliberative
officials must be accountable for their decisions.259
democracy theory in turn teaches that government accountability requires
that citizens be able to demand explanations from their public officials, and
the decisions of those officials are legitimate only to the extent that these
officials can provide acceptable explanations.260 Citizens can then cast
their votes on the basis of the explanations given by public officials.261 Of
course, for citizens to be able to demand explanations from the State, they
must know what their government does, and thus the State must act
256
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“Consideration of both the
offender and the offense in order to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a
progressive and humanizing development.”).
257
See Tien, supra note 86, at 6–7 (“Consider the following situation: in a drug-infested
neighborhood, dealers use public coin telephones so that their calls cannot be traced to their home
phones. The coin phones are then removed to stop such calls. Such regulation is not fully captured by
the model of sanction-backed or duty-declaring rules. Neither sanctions nor duties are imposed upon
the drug dealers by such action. They remain ‘free’ to act, but their conditions of action have been
changed through the elimination of a resource (phones) with a design feature that facilitated drug
dealing (untraceability).”).
258
See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,
57–58 (1890) (recognizing the State’s parens patriae authority “for the prevention of injury to those
who cannot protect themselves”).
259
See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2009)
(“[V]oters must be able to hold public officials accountable for their specific policy choices to ensure
that those decisions are consistent with the preferences of a majority.”).
260
Id. at 1254–55.
261
See John J. Worley, Deliberative Constitutionalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 431, 442–44 (“[T]he
hallmark of deliberative democracy is that it requires voters to deliberate about how they should vote
on the basis of their impartial judgments as to what best conduces to the common good rather than on
the basis of what best advances their own individual or group interests.”).

2014]

LIMITS ON THE PERFECT PREVENTIVE STATE

927

262

transparently.
Yet, perfect prevention often can operate opaquely,263
undermining deliberative democracy, government accountability, and
ultimately the legitimacy of State action.264
In a similar vein, perfect prevention can interfere with civil
disobedience. By making criminal conduct practically impossible, perfect
prevention eliminates the most obvious avenue of protesting of an unjust
law—engaging in the outlawed conduct. It opens the door for another,
however: those who object to the criminalization of the conduct targeted
by perfect prevention or the use of perfect prevention in a given context
may protest by publicly seeking to circumvent the technology. For
instance, when a court in the United Kingdom ordered ISPs to block access
to The Pirate Bay website on the ground that it provided movies, music,
and other content for download in violation of copyright law, methods to
circumvent the block appeared within minutes.265 Some of those who
provided the workarounds defended them as a protest against a court order
they perceived to be unjust.266 But again, either kind of civil disobedience
relies on perfect prevention being transparent. If citizens are not aware that
a restriction has been implemented by the government and that its purpose
is to prevent certain criminal conduct, they will not know enough to
recognize that civil disobedience may provide a useful mode of protest.
Moreover, perfect prevention undermines the value of less intentional,
but perhaps more fundamental, interactions between the public and
government regulation, and specifically what Julie Cohen calls the “Play of
Everyday Practice.”267 Unlike civil disobedience or political engagement,
the play of everyday practice originates “in ad hoc, tactical responses to
institutional structures and cultural patterns.”268 It involves an informal
262
See Staszewski, supra note 259, at 1281 (“If citizens are unaware that a particular government
official has made a specific policy decision, they cannot possibly hold that official accountable in any
meaningful way for this action. A requirement or expectation that the public official will provide a
reasoned explanation for the decision enables interested citizens and other public officials to evaluate,
discuss, and criticize the action, as well as potentially to seek political or legal reform.”); see also
David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 104 (2011)
(“[D]eliberative democracy requires transparency in order for it to be operative; without transparency,
deliberative democracy cannot exist.”).
263
See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
264
See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895–99 (2006)
(outlining the arguments for transparency as being fundamental to democratic government).
265
Zack Whittaker, U.K.’s Largest ISP Blocks the Pirate Bay, but to No Avail, CNET (June 20,
2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57457001-93/u.k.s-largest-isp-blocks-the-pirate-bay-but-tono-avail/.
266
See Ben Woods, Pirate Bay: Protest Ban with Local MPs, ZDNET (May 1, 2012),
http://www.zdnet.com/pirate-bay-protest-ban-with-local-mps-4010026052/ (“[The Pirate Bay] has
urged its users to write to their local MPs and ISPs to protest the ban as it represents a form of
censorship that could have far reaching consequences in future cases.”).
267
See COHEN, supra note 51, at 50–57 (describing the play of everyday practice).
268
Id. at 55.
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pushing against and working within the structural constraints imposed by
technological capabilities, cultural rules, and government regulation.269
The play of everyday practice is “shaped from the outset by institutional
and material constraints,” “takes what it can get,” and “can provoke
reexamination of the law.”270 From a practical standpoint, the play of
everyday practice is central to moral and intellectual development and can
lead to transformative creativity and innovation in response to
constraints.271 For instance, Cohen cites the example of people who, in
response to widespread video surveillance in New York City, engaged in
creative, transgressive performances on camera or developed Internetbased applications to allow people to avoid being watched.272 The play of
everyday practice might also include innovation that occurs through
tolerated, illegal conduct.273 In the copyright realm, for example, the
notice-and-takedown provisions of the DMCA have allowed copyright
owners to tolerate certain infringing uses of copyrighted material, which in
turn has led to innovative business models for copyright owners to profit
from their content.274
Cohen identifies a number of requirements for the play of everyday
practice, two of which are most obviously threatened by perfect
prevention: operational transparency and semantic discontinuity.275
Operational transparency “means that people must know how they are
situated in code and technologies, what is being done to them, how code
and technology limit their actions and choices, and why.”276 Operational
transparency is necessary because it allows people to “exercise meaningful
control over their surroundings” in the same way that one needs to know
the basic laws of science to manipulate the physical world.277 Semantic
discontinuity involves gaps and imperfections in systems of control and
surveillance.278 These gaps and imperfections are necessary because they
are, in some sense, the playground—the (theoretical) space in which the
play of everyday practice occurs.
The requirement of operational transparency reinforces the importance
of broad transparency in the operation of the perfect preventive state. Yet
269

See id. (discussing the inherent difficulties in characterizing play).
Id. at 50, 55.
271
See id. at 54, 227 (stating that some individuals “engage in more transgressive performances,
‘acting out’ for the cameras,” while others “help people plot circuitous routes around them”).
272
Id. at 52.
273
See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 618–20 (2008) (discussing the
frequency of tolerated copyright violations).
274
ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 119–21.
275
COHEN, supra note 51, at 223–24.
276
Balkin, supra note 59, at 103.
277
COHEN, supra note 51, at 235.
278
Balkin, supra note 59, at 103; see COHEN, supra note 51, at 239–41 (describing semantic
discontinuity as “the opposite of seamlessness”).
270
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the fact that perfect prevention targets conduct that has been legislatively
defined as criminal complicates matters. The play of everyday practice
would best flourish if perfect prevention were transparent not only in what
it seeks to prevent and the State’s role in doing so, but also in how it seeks
to prevent criminal conduct.279 This pits the play of everyday practice
against the State’s interest in crime-fighting, which is best advanced by
limiting public access to information about law enforcement strategies.280
Similarly, the need for semantic discontinuity would suggest that the State
should build imperfections into perfect prevention that allow for innovative
play in the gaps.281 Once again, however, such efforts would likely be
resisted by those who view crime prevention and societal protection as the
State’s most important responsibilities.282
One way to avoid the potentially intractable political tension that
results when one starts talking about efforts that undermine crime
prevention is to focus instead on ensuring that the legislature’s power to
criminalize conduct is not overused. Scholars frequently bemoan the
proliferation of criminal statutes, noting, inter alia, that they vest too much
unchecked discretion in state actors.283 That discretion has ample
downsides, but one upside is that it can ensure that overbroad criminal
statutes are not used to prosecute conduct that society did not mean to
forbid.284 When a criminal statute is used, however, as the foundation for
perfect preventive technology, that discretion disappears and all instances
of the targeted conduct are potentially eliminated. Moreover, once conduct
is described as criminal, it becomes difficult to argue that the government
should forego any opportunity to prevent it. This is less troubling for

279
See COHEN, supra note 51, at 236–37 (noting the importance of “technological due process”
which would require “the public provision of meaningful information about the ways that traditionally
public functions are performed”).
280
See text accompanying notes 238–41 (detailing some of the investigative techniques available
and the reasons for their secrecy).
281
See COHEN, supra note 51, at 264 (arguing that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions
should apply only to technologies that protect copyrighted materials while “incorporate[ing] more
tolerance for play”).
282
See Balkin, supra note 59, at 118 (recognizing the tension between Cohen’s argument for
semantic discontinuity and treatment of undesirable conduct as a threat to society’s security).
283
See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005) (noting that a “common feature[]” of
overcriminalization is “excessive unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities”).
284
See Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L.
532, 533 (1970) (suggesting that the criminal codes are overbroad in scope since they criminalize all
actions of which people disapprove and leave prosecutors to decide what laws are necessary to
enforce); Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 816
(2012) (arguing that prosecutors decriminalize conduct by using “discretionary decision making” in
deciding what to prosecute).
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crimes like murder or rape, where the harms are obvious and severe.285
But where it raises constitutional concerns, as in the unauthorized
duplication of copyrighted material,286 or is less clearly harmful, as in
sleeping on a park bench,287 the political momentum in favor of crime
prevention and the sweeping effect of perfect prevention counsel for more
judicious use of the criminal law and narrow construction.
C. The Ordering of Crime Preventing Measures
When comparing punishment and prevention, most scholars agree that
the tools of the preventive state should be used only in those situations
where punishment cannot effectively prevent crime.288 Such a limitation,
which finds some support in Supreme Court jurisprudence,289 derives from
respect that the punitive state pays to individual autonomy.290 Punishment
respects an actor’s choice. She can avoid punishment by choosing not to
offend, but if she decides to offend, the punitive state will punish her only
in proportion to her chosen wrongdoing.291 Meanwhile, the preventive
state curtails autonomy by taking that choice out of the actor’s hands
altogether.292 If this were not bad enough, the tools of the preventive state
also tend to be overbroad, restricting far more liberty than is necessary to
285
See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 110 (suggesting that perfect law enforcement for serious crimes
is appealing).
286
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (recognizing that the Copyright Act has
“built-in First Amendment accommodations” such as the fair use doctrine which permits exact
reproduction of copyrighted works in particular circumstances like news reporting, teaching, and
research so that unauthorized copying is not always punishable (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 219 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
287
See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1575–77 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (discussing
ordinances that forbid sleeping in public for possible Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional
violations).
288
See Cole, supra note 9, at 696 (“[A]ny consideration of preventive detention should begin with
a strong presumption that society should deal with dangerous people through criminal prosecution and
punishment, not preventive detention.”); Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants,
and Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 85 (2005) (arguing that preventive detention should be
permitted only for “those who cannot conform to the law, including those not in control of their
behavior”); Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 85 (proposing that prevention is permissible “only as a gapfiller, to solve problems that the criminal process cannot address”).
289
See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (noting the “constitutional importance of
distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment ‘from other dangerous persons
who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings’” (quoting Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997))); see also Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 85–90 (arguing that
Supreme Court precedents implicitly recognize that the criminal process is preferred over preventive
measures).
290
Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 90–91.
291
Id.
292
See Morse, supra note 15, at 1122 (“[I]t is a massive infringement on [dangerous agents’]
liberty and autonomy to institute pure preventive detention for responsible agents.”); Schulhofer, supra
note 9, at 93 (arguing that in order to not infringe personal autonomy, “the criminal process [must
serve] as its first line of defense”).

2014]

LIMITS ON THE PERFECT PREVENTIVE STATE

931

293

prevent crime.
Thus, where both punishment and prevention might be
used to prevent crime, punishment is typically viewed as the better
option,294 though scholars debate precisely when the punitive state can be
said to be inadequate and when prevention is appropriate.295
Where, though, does perfect prevention fit into this hierarchy?
Specifically, how does perfect prevention compare to punishment? How
does it compare to prevention? The initial answer to the first question is
straightforward: punishment should be preferred over perfect prevention
for the same autonomy-respecting reason as it is preferred over prevention.
As noted previously, punishment respects an actor’s autonomy by making
any loss of liberty contingent on her choice to break the law.296 Like
prevention, perfect prevention, on the other hand, deprives the actor of that
choice entirely.297 Consequently, when both options are available for the
prevention of certain criminal conduct, punishment should be preferred
over perfect prevention.
To those who value individual autonomy as a right of the highest
order, this analysis may be sufficient to require that perfect prevention
never be used. But to those who are not absolutists about individual
autonomy, it is quite plausible that there might be instances where a certain
kind of criminal conduct is sufficiently harmful and has proven sufficiently
resistant to the deterrent effects of punishment that punishment can be said
293
See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text (stating that efforts by both punitive and
preventive governments to thwart criminal activity—such as threats of punishment, preventive
detention, and restraining orders—inhibit an individual’s freedom to engage in a wide range of legal
activity in addition to preventing criminal conduct).
294
See supra note 288 and accompanying text (arguing that most scholars agree that preventive
measures should only be used when punishment fails to prevent crime). But see Slobogin, supra note
10, at 122 (arguing for a scheme of prevention to replace the current criminal justice system based on
punishment).
295
See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 134 (2006) (arguing that one who “wants to commit serious crime so
badly that he is willing to be deprived of liberty or suffer similarly serious consequences” should be
eligible for preventive detention); Corrado, supra note 288, at 108 (noting the difficulty in
differentiating between the individual who is not deterred and the one who cannot be deterred); Walen,
supra note 178, at 904 (suggesting evidentiary difficulties arise when determining whether to detain
someone on the basis that they might do future harm).
296
This is not to say that the threat of punishment does not intrude on an actor’s autonomy at all.
It certainly does, but that intrusion is the smallest intrusion possible for the State to still fulfill its
obligation to protect its citizenry. See Morse, supra note 3, at 58 (calling the threat of punishment for a
violation of the criminal law an “ordinary, ‘base-rate’ infringement” on autonomy).
297
Note that this argument depends on there being a legitimate autonomy interest in deciding
whether to break the law. See supra notes 179–91 and accompanying text (arguing that the state
intervention threatens the individual’s interests in lawful conduct and that the freedom of thought,
which prohibits punishment for thoughts alone, also includes the power to decide whether to break the
law or undertake civil disobedience). If that interest is not legitimate, then a properly tailored perfect
preventive measure that makes criminal conduct, and only criminal conduct, practically impossible,
would be less intrusive on an individual’s legitimate autonomy than punishment.
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to have failed, thus opening the door to the use of perfect prevention.298
The question of punishment’s failure in preventing a certain kind of
criminal conduct will require an assessment of both the seriousness of the
harm caused by the conduct and the extent to which society has exhausted
the potential of punishment to deter the conduct. This Article will not
attempt herein to identify the threshold at which the requisite harmfulness
or exhaustion can be met. Note, however, that the magnitude of the
pressure to conclude that punishment has failed will depend in large part
on the political power wielded by those who are injured by the targeted
criminal conduct. This pressure will threaten to distort the process by
which the State decides whether certain perfect preventive measures are
appropriate.299
Turning then to the question of preference between prevention and
perfect prevention, the comparison is somewhat similar to comparing
apples and oranges. Though both perfect prevention and prevention
intrude on an actor’s ability to choose whether to break the law, prevention
effects an autonomy intrusion that is greater in magnitude but more
narrowly targeted than that of perfect prevention. The preventive state
imposes often-substantial limitations on the liberty of targeted individuals
to engage in both lawful and unlawful conduct.300 The perfect preventive
state, on the other hand, limits everyone’s autonomy to a lesser degree by
seeking to prevent only criminal conduct.
Which, then, is more intrusive on liberty and therefore less desirable?
One way to answer this question is to begin with the reasonable
assumption that the State may properly prevent actual criminal conduct and
then to assess to what extent prevention and perfect prevention each
intrudes unnecessarily on individual autonomy in pursuit of that goal.
With respect to prevention, this means inquiring into the accuracy of the
State’s assessment of an individual’s likelihood of offending, i.e., the risk
of false determinations of dangerousness, however that is defined,301 and
the extent to which the preventive measure in question restricts lawful
298
For instance, more than ten thousand people die annually in motor vehicle accidents involving
drunk drivers. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2009 DATA:
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING 1 (2010), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811385.pdf.
Despite extensive and costly efforts to deter drunk driving through traditional means, the rate of drunkdriving-related fatalities has remained constant for several years. See Rich, supra note 46, at 829
(describing a decline in the effectiveness of efforts to reduce drunk driving in the 1990s). Thus, the
argument could be made that with respect to preventing drunk driving, the punitive state has failed.
299
See generally Cohen, supra note 44 (discussing strategies, including the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA, pushed by “major copyright industries” to prevent online copyright
infringement and protect their business interests).
300
See supra note 168 and accompanying text (arguing that broad preventive measures reduce the
freedom to engage in lawful conduct).
301
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 4, at 1450 (criticizing the use of prior record as a predictive
factor for dangerousness).
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conduct. With respect to perfect prevention, the inquiry should focus on
how widespread the targeted criminal conduct is, and thus how much the
perfect preventive technology also prevents non-criminal conduct because
some people will never seek to engage in criminal conduct yet will still
suffer an intrusion on their liberty.302 This analysis is somewhat more finegrained than that of the libertarian absolutist, but it still requires resolution
of difficult normative questions. For instance, how many people who
never would have engaged in the targeted criminal conduct must be subject
to perfect prevention to outweigh the mistaken preventive detention of one
person who would not have committed the targeted crime? I will leave
such questions for another day. Nonetheless, they teach that whether
prevention or perfect prevention is preferable must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.
V. CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE INQUIRY
Perfect prevention—the State’s use of technology to make certain
criminal conduct practically impossible—is a new paradigm for crime
prevention that creates opportunities for the State to cure social ills that
have been resistant to traditional punishment and targeted prevention. At
the same time, perfect prevention poses new threats to individual liberties
and to the relationship between the State and its citizens, as proper
limitations on the perfect preventive state have not been adequately
developed. This Article raises some of these concerns herein and has
proposed responsive limits to the substantive scope and application of
perfect prevention.
The perfect preventive state demands that we explicitly recognize an
individual’s legitimate interest in being allowed to decide whether to break
the law. Recognition of this interest suggests three limits on the perfect
preventive state: (1) the State cannot interfere directly with an individual’s
decision whether to break the law; (2) the State should not condition one’s
freedom to engage in otherwise lawful conduct on her future intent to
engage in criminal conduct; and (3) the State should be transparent in its
use of perfect preventive technology, clarifying its role in the
302
For a discussion of the latter issue, see Rich, supra note 46, at 820–21. I thank Professor
Jonathan Zittrain for the observation that this analysis is analogous to that required by the existence of
the “substantial noninfringing use” safe harbor in the copyright infringement context. See Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (discussing the balance between
effective protection for the copyright holder and fair use by consumers). Unfortunately, the substantial
non-infringing use standard provides little clear guidance on how to balance “non-infringing” or
noncriminal conduct against infringing or criminal conduct. See Shane Nix, Lifting the Supreme
Court’s Thumb Off of the Scale: Promoting Technological and Entrepreneurial Innovation, While
Protecting the Interests of Copyright Holders After MGM v. Grokster, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT.
L. 49, 88 (2005) (“[I]t is unclear as to what evidentiary standards are required to find inducement under
Grokster and ‘substantial non-infringing use’ for contributory infringement under Sony.”).
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implementation of that technology and articulating the conduct it seeks to
prevent.
By imposing a blanket restriction on all people, perfect prevention can
interfere with valuable interactions between the State and its citizens and
hamper the “play of everyday practice.”303 These concerns underscore the
need for transparency in perfect prevention, counsel in favor of perfect
preventive technologies that leave open the room for “play,” and place
increased importance on legislative decisions to criminalize conduct.
Finally, because punishment best respects individual autonomy, it should
be the preferred means of crime prevention vis-à-vis perfect prevention.
Nonetheless, there may be situations where punishment fails to prevent
enough instances of particularly harmful conduct and where the use of
other means of crime prevention might be justified. The proper hierarchy
of perfect prevention and prevention is less clear-cut, however, and which
approach is preferable will require a case-by-case assessment.
Numerous issues regarding the use of perfect prevention remain
outstanding. First, what sort of procedural limitations should be placed on
the perfect preventive state? Because perfect prevention applies to
everyone, the normal due process paradigm, which requires individualized
finding before the State can deprive a person of a cognizable liberty or
property interest, does not cleanly apply. What sort of findings, then,
should we require before we allow the State to impose perfect preventive
technologies? Also, what sort of requirements should we impose on
perfect preventive technology to ensure that it targets criminal conduct,
and only criminal conduct, as accurately as possible? And once perfect
prevention technology is in place, what sort of review process should be
required to guarantee that we do not become wedded to archaic and
malfunctioning technology?304
Second, how are political pressures likely to influence the potential
adoption of perfect preventive measures? What constituencies have an
interest in the development of the perfect preventive state? How should
the process of assessing potential perfect preventive measures account for
these political pressures?
Third, under what circumstances should perfect prevention be
preferred over punishment? How much value do we place on the
autonomy that is lost when one is prevented from engaging in criminal
conduct? This Article argues that there is no legitimate autonomy interest
in committing crime, but that we do have an interest in deciding to break
the law. If that is so, how valuable is that autonomy interest? Is it proper
303

See COHEN, supra note 51, at 50–57.
See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 114–17 (describing the pitfalls of using technology to apply
legal standards); Wagner, supra note 51, at 462–63 (arguing that an enforcement scheme reliant on
technology will lack flexibility and stability).
304
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to weigh that interest against the social harm of certain criminal conduct?
Fourth, is there some hybrid between prevention and perfect
prevention that is superior to both? In other words, is the best approach
one in which we identify those individuals most likely to engage in certain
criminal conduct and use technology to make it practically impossible for
them to do so?305 Or do issues about fairness and accuracy make such a
paradigm impracticable?
Fifth, at what point, if any, should the concerns raised by perfect
prevention give way to the societal interest in crime prevention? Are there
categories of crimes—like terrorism or sexual assault or computer
crimes—that are so severe that individual autonomy should be set aside in
favor of protecting the public? If so, how do we impose limits on those
categories to prevent continuing encroachment by perfect prevention in the
name of public safety and crime prevention?

305
See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 667 (recognizing the potential of technology
to prevent crime by imposing minimally-intrusive restrictions on the liberty of responsible but
dangerous individuals).

